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ABSTRACT
AN EVALUATION OF RISK PRIORITY NUMBERS IN
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE
PREDICTION OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Anthony W. Dean
Old Dominion University, 2003
Director: Dr. Andres Sousa-Poza

Complex systems such as military aircraft and naval ships are difficult to cost effectively
maintain. Frequently, large-scale maintenance of complex systems (i.e., a naval vessel) is
based on the reduction of the system to its base subcomponents and the use of
manufacturer-suggested, time-directed, preventative maintenance, which is augmented
during the systems lifecycle with predictive maintenance which assesses the system’s ability
to perform its mission objectives.

While preventative maintenance under certain

conditions can increase reliability, preventative maintenance systems are often costly,
increase down time, and allow for maintenance-induced failures, which may decrease the
reliability of the system (Ebeling, 1997).

This maintenance scheme ignores the complexity o f the system it tries to maintain. By
combining the base components or subsystems into a larger system, and introducing
human interaction with the system, the complexity of the system creates a unique entity
that cannot be completely understood by basing predictability of the system to perform
tasks on the reduction of the system to its subcomponents.

This study adds to the scholarly literature by developing a model, based on the traditional
failure modes and effects analysis commonly used for research and development projects,
to capture the effects of the human interaction with the system. Based on the ability of
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personnel assigned to operate and maintain the system, the severity of the system failure
on the impact on the metasystems ability to perform its mission and the likelihood of the
event of the failure to occur.

Findings of the research indicate that the human interaction with the system, in as far as
the ability of the personnel to repair and maintain the system, is a vital component in the
ability to predict likelihood o f the system failure and the prioritization o f the risk of system
failure, may be adequately captured for analysis through use of expert opinion elicitation.
The use of the expert’s opinions may provide additional robustness to the modeling and
analysis of system behavior in the event that failure occurs.
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1
CHAPTER

I

IN T R O D U C T IO N

Complex Systems
Complex systems such as military aircraft and naval ships are difficult to cost effectively
maintain (Economic Report o f the President, 2002, US Office o f Management and Budget,
2002). One common approach o f maintaining these types o f complex systems has always
been time-directed or preventative maintenance systems. While preventative maintenance
under certain conditions can increase reliability, preventative maintenance systems are often
costly, increase down time, and allow for maintenance-induced failures, which may decrease
the reliability o f the system (Ebeling, 1997). In complex systems like naval ships, where the
mission completion is o f the utm ost importance, compelling factors, such as time, cost and
litde or no room for failure, are sufficient reasons to move toward an effective, knowledge
information-based, reliability system.

Many problems are complex, and therefore few are predictable. In this sense, complexity is a
question of degree, and specifically the degree o f our ignorance (Biggiero, 2001). To view a
system as complex, the degree o f complexity of the system is based on the quantity o f
information that is known about that system. The number o f elements that make up a system
and the large number o f interactions among those elements contribute to the existence of
complexity.

Given that complex systems have the common characteristic o f structure

Thejournal model used in this dissertation is the TLngineermg ManagementJournal
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(Biggiero, 2001; Flood and Carson, 1993;), often the researcher will use that characteristic to
develop a model o f the system.

Vemuri (in Flood and Carson, 1993) alludes to the following four precepts, three o f which
must be considered based on the measurement, data, theory, law sequence.

The fourth

precept relates to the criterion that characterizes metasystems:
1. Complex situations are often partly or wholly unobservable, that is measurement is
noisy or unachievable (e.g. any attempt may destroy the integrity o f the system).
2. It is difficult to establish laws from theory in complex situations as there is often
not enough data or the data is unreliable so that only probabilistic laws may be
achievable.
3. Complex situations are often soft and incorporate value systems that are abundant,
different, and extremely difficult to observe or measure. They may at best be
represented using nominal and interval scales.
4. Complex situations are “open” and thus evolve over time.
Given Vemuri’s assessment o f complexity, models o f complex systems can only yield an
approximation o f the systems’ behavior.

Biggiero (2001) has stated that “ .. .“complex” is an object which cannot be predictable because
of logical impossibility or because its predictability would require a computational power far
beyond any physical feasibility, now and forever.”

In attempting to model the complex

system, “we are seeking to provide a descriptive and explanatory account that provides the
simplest, least complex way o f accommodating the data that experience (experimentation and
observation) has put at our disposal (Reseller, 1998).”
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One object o f modeling is to transform unclear, poorly articulated perceptions o f a system into
visible well-defined models useful for many purposes.

Models are substitutes for reality, but

should be descriptive enough for system elements under consideration to be useful. Principal
uses o f models have always been to pose “policy” questions to the model and from the results
obtained leam how to cope with that subset o f the real world being modeled (Sage, 1977).

Three essential steps in constructing a model are:
•

determine the problem definition value system and system synthesis elements
most relevant to a particular problem

•

determine the structural relationship among these elements

•

determine parametric coefficients within the determined structure (Sage, 1977).

“The crudest approximation, if it provides hints for the solution o f a broad range o f problems,
has every advantage over the most elegant mathematical law which asserts nothing o f interest.”
— Brewster Ghiselin (in Petrinovich and McGaugh, 1976).
generators o f predictions about the system.

Models function as recursive

A model is necessarily simpler than the

environment it represents, which allows it to run faster than the processes in the environment
(i.e. anticipate the actions). This allows the system to compensate perturbations before they
have the opportunity to damage the system (Heylighen, et al, 1995).

Statement o f Problem
The approach to model development places an emphasis on the formal reasoning and
representation o f the system to be studied. The model is formed from the perspective o f the
individual and the individuals’ basic epistemological stance as a basis for the selection criteria.
“According to the “modeling view” o f knowledge acquisition proposed by Clancy, the
modeling activity must establish a correspondence between a knowledge base and two separate
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subsystems: the agent’s behavior (i.e. the problem solving expertise) and its own environment
(the problem domain)” (Guarino, 2000). The existing knowledge (base knowledge) forms a
framework for the conceptual units by mapping their assumed interrelationships to allow for a
more robust study o f the system’s functionality.

Frequently, large-scale maintenance o f complex systems (i.e., a naval vessel) is based on the
reduction o f the system to its base subcomponents and the use o f manufacturer-suggested,
time-directed, preventative maintenance, which is augmented during the system’s lifecycle with
predictive maintenance which assesses the system’s ability to perform its mission objectives.
This maintenance scheme ignores the complexity o f the system it is trying to maintain. By
combining the base components or subsystems into a larger system, and introducing human
interaction with the system, the complexity o f the system creates a unique entity that cannot be
completely understood by basing predictability o f the system to perform tasks on the
reduction of the system to its subcomponents.

Purpose of the Study
This research addresses whether a methodology can be developed that establishes a
relationship between the knowledge base tightly held by the system experts, the data captured
in the maintenance history o f the complex system, and the behavior o f the system.

The

relationship can then be explored as a means to predict failure o f the complex system to
complete its tasks or missions, thus minimizing system down time for assessment and
unnecessary maintenance.
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Overview o f the D issertatio n
In order to explore the feasibility o f such a methodology to model complex systems, the
dissertation will review the salient literature (Chapter 2) that comprises the bodies of
knowledge reflective o f the subject matter, specifically: knowledge management, systems
modeling and expert elicitation techniques. From the literature we will attempt to derive the
need for the methodology in Chapter 3 by showing the ‘gap’ in the body o f existing knowledge
that the research is trying to bridge. In Chapter 4 a conceptual model is developed and a plan
o f research is described to provide an overview o f how an existing method o f system behavior
modeling - failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) - may be modified to provide a more
holistic view o f legacy system behavior through the use o f expert knowledge.

The

methodology presented allows for a transfer o f tacit knowledge into an explicit form to make
predictions regarding the system behavior. Results from the application o f the conceptual
methodology are presented (Chapter 5) and discussed (Chapter 6) providing suggestions
(Chapter 7) for further research.
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CHAPTER

I I

L IT E R A T U R E REV IEW

Overview
For tbis research, the significant bodies o f knowledge permeate systems management,
knowledge management and systems modeling.

This research effort integrates these to

develop a systems methodology to provide organizational support to the management o f a
complex maintenance system.

Modeling
I

Complex
Systems

Knowledge
Maintenance
management \
i
Assumptions o f
complex systems

Complexity
(Reductionism vs. Holism)
Expert
Elicitation
-

"— i-

System
Behavior ■«
Analysis

Research
Contribution
(Gap)
Figure 1 Funneled Representation to Gap in the Literature.
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Figure 1 takes the perspective o f the literature to be a wide funnel o f knowledge that can be
gradually narrowed until we reach that ‘gap’ in the body o f knowledge where the research
attempts to explain the gap through the development o f a methodology. By development o f
the methodology, the gap is then closed, thus contributing to the broadening o f the body o f
knowledge. This chapter will present the literature to promote the foundation for the
methodology presented in the next chapter.

Systems M odeling
According to Sage (1997), a major objective in the management o f such a system is to obtain
information necessary to organize and direct individual programs associated with the
production o f products and services. He further states that this information can only be
obtained through an appropriate program o f systematic measurements and the development
o f appropriate models for use in processing this information. In effect, to appropriately
manage a large complex system, it is necessary to develop a decision support system to aid in
the decision making process.

As with all decision support systems, the “twin engines” are data and models. Models provide
the means for the conversion o f data into actionable information. In fact, the model pinpoints
the actual data needs. By the same token, the model itself is constrained by the available data
(Mohan and Holstein, 1999).

Model development is further compounded if the system under

observation is complex. The rendering o f this information into useful and meaningful data
requires the development o f an appropriate model. In general, models - simplification o f “real
world” processes by making assumptions concerning the system’s true state o f nature —have
uncertainties due to incomplete knowledge. These uncertainties arise when the particular value
or population o f values o f concern cannot be presented with complete confidence because o f
A lack o f understanding or limitation o f knowledge (Haimes, 1998). This usually tends to
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cause a dilemma for managers trying to make decisions, due to lack o f supportive measures
available that accurately model system behavior due to the complexity o f the system.
Managers are then left to rely on the knowledge o f the “system experts” who routinely work
with the system and base their judgments solely on their advice.

The decision support system m ust include a flexible base methodology to allow deployment
across various system classes. The conflict o f viewpoints involved in producing the precise
form o f the methodology to be deployed is in itself problematic (Flood and Carson, 1993), as
there are a vast number o f stakeholders with individual needs that must be addressed. While
basic similarities will exist across comparable systems, the variations o f equipment within
specific system classes and varying skill level o f the system operators in maintaining and
operating the system(s) give pause to deployment o f a single knowledge-based decision model.
The model m ust have flexibility for deployment across the various platforms. Consequently,
the methodology o f the system design must also be flexible so that implementation o f the
system is consistent across the platforms, but still is specific for the individual system class.
T his leads to the differentiation o f the various types o f system methodologies that may be used
for the development o f the decision support system that is the ultimate goal o f this research
endeavor.

Assumptions o f C om plex System Principles
As previously stated, the proposed research model addresses the management o f a complex
maintenance system. With the idea o f a “complex” system in mind, it becomes important to
clarify the notion o f what constitutes a complex system. While various methodologies exist for
the development o f system-based initiatives, each methodology must adhere to a basic
underlying group o f principles to ensure that an effective study and an understanding o f the
system, in its current state, is achieved. The specific approaches may differ but the underlying
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'logic' is a common thread running through each o f the methodologies (Keating, 2000). The
following four system tenets amalgamate the concept o f complex system analysis.
•

Simple vs. Complex Systems
o

Characteristics o f a complex systems (Jackson in Keating et al, 2002)
■ Large number o f variables or elements
■ Rich interactions among elements
■

Difficulty in identification o f attributes and emergent properties

■

Loosely organized (structured) interaction among elements

■

Probabilistic, as opposed to deterministic, behavior in the system

■ System evolution and emergence over time
"

Purposeful pursuit o f multiple goals by system entities or subsystems
(pluralistic)

■

Possibility o f behavioral influence or intervention in the system

■ Largely open to the transport of energy, information, or resources
from /to across the system boundary to the environment
o

Characteristics o f a simple system
■ Small number o f variables or elements
" Poor interactions between elements
■ Ease o f identification o f attributes
■ Deterministic behavior in the system
9 System does not evolve over time
* System is n o t effected by behavioral influences
■ Largely closed to the transport of energy, information, or resources
from /to across the system boundary to the environment
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•

Self-Organization. Self-organization holds that m ost of the structural and
behavioral properties o f a system emerge through interaction o f the system
elements (Clemson, 1984). Therefore, the actual design o f a system can only be
partially specified in advance o f system operation. From the systems perspective,
this explains why the m ost thoughtful and carefully designed systems have
unintended consequences. In essence, system behavior and informal structure
emerge only through system operation, regardless o f the detailed design efforts
conducted prior to system deployment.

Effective design of complex systems ensures that only the essential constraints are imposed on
the operation o f the system. In systems theory this concept is known as minimum critical
specification (Chems). Over-specification o f system requirements is: (1) wasteful of scarce
resources necessary to monitor and control system performance, (2) reduces system autonomy
which in turn restricts the agility and responsiveness of the system to compensate fo r
environmental shifts, and (3)fails toperm it subsystem elements to self-organige based on their
contextual knowledge, understanding andproximity to the operating environment. Therefore,
self-organisation suggests that system solutions should specify only the minimal requirements
necessary to achieve system objectives. (Keating 2000)

•

System Darkness. This concept suggests that the complex system when viewed
from any vantage point will not clearly present itself in its entirety. The complex
system and any representation o f the complex system can only be described by
what is known, observed or suspected. Unknown, unobserved, unrepresentative,
and emergent characteristics will be present and not known to the systems
architect.

•

Complementarity. The principle o f complementarity suggests "Any two different
perspectives (or models) about a system will reveal truths about that system that
are neither entirely independent nor entirely compatible" (Clemson, 1984). Each
system perspective is correct from a particular vantage point of the system. In
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addition, each system perspective may also be considered, to some degree,
incorrect from an alternate system vantage point The important argument is that
there are multiple system vantage points, each adding to a more holistic impression
o f the system. Shifts in vantage points, environmental conditions, or knowledge
will influence perspectives o f a system. It is naive to consider there is only one
system perspective that is "correct". Therefore, it is a mistake to conduct inquiry as
to which system perspective is 'right'. Assumption o f a ‘right' system encourages
advocacy and competition instead o f dialog and collaboration. (Keating, 2000)

Additionally, a system study must also address the needs o f the individuals) who express
interest or concern for the performance o f the system to meet a desired outcome or
functionality o f the system under study. To accomplish this task, a set o f criteria needs to be
established to determine whether the system architect has developed a level of competency in
understanding the system under study, and has determined an effective method o f addressing
the concerns o f the desired outcomes o f the system. The use o f the developed criteria can then
be used to evaluate the study (design, approach, accomplishment, effectiveness, strengths,
weaknesses, etc.).

According to Jenkins (in Flood and Carson, 1993), in order to properly frame the problem
context, the systems architect m ust be able to answer the following questions. How did the
problem arise? W ho are the people that believe it to be a problem? W ho made the decision to
implement a planning decision and what is the chain o f argument leading to making a
decision? Is the problem the right one and is the solution important? While these statements
are part of the first phase o f the Jenkins model, they remain true and pertinent in all attempts
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at the study o f any system, simple or complex. These questions should lead the systems
architect to the following statements and conclusions to begin his study o f the system.
•

W hat are the objectives o f the system as defined by the entity identifying the problem?
How are these objectives being expressed?

•

Development o f critical system issues (Relevant Circumstances)
o

W hat are the primary objectives o f the stakeholders that the system analysis is
attempting to resolve?

•

Assumptions and constraints for system and study (Rationality)
o

W hat assumptions m ust the systems architect make to begin his analysis? Are
there any constraints (time, budget, data) that the systems architect must work
within?

•

System problem statement
o

A concise, descriptive statement o f the problem; developed to be a
representation o f the best ‘current’ framing o f the problematic situation.

The biggest problem that a systems architect faces is in the selection o f the methodology he
will use to analyze the system. In order to effectively select the methodology, he must have a
clear picture o f the system and how it functions in order to select the methodology(ies) that
best fit the situation at hand. The systems architect should begin by addressing the what
(system), how (sub-systems) and why (the wider-system or system environment) o f the
problem context (Checkland, 1999). The problem context developed is meant to give the
systems architect a means to clearly identify the system that is to be studied. That is to say that
the problem context should give the systems architect the ability to identify the system whose
output/outcom es are the ones perceived to be the problem. He accomplishes this by
performing the following tasks:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

•

Define the System. W hat is the system to be studied? Is it the correct system? From
what perspective is the system to be viewed? W hat components make up the system?

•

Bounding the System. W hat are the system boundaries? While the initial boundaries
may be arbitrary, the systems analyst must make reasonable assumptions as to what
those boundaries should be.

•

System representation. H ow is the system to be represented? How are the systems
components (subsystems) interactions presented to show the relations o f the system
with its environment, the relations within the system among the subsystems, and its
inputs and outputs o f the system?

•

System output/outcom e (Actual vs. Ideal). W hat/how is the system currently
functioning vs. how would the system stakeholders like for the system to function.
Requires the architect to establish the needs o f the stakeholders and the capabilities o f
the current system.

•

System expectations. W hat are the stakeholders’ expectations for the system? How do
they envision the system to function?

•

System measure o f performance. How is the system’s (under study) performance
measured? Is the measurement to be quantitative or qualitative? Who is measuring the
system performance?

Another perspective on modeling system behavior w orth looking at was developed by Gibson.
Gibson’s methodology (Gibson, 1991) consists o f six major “steps”
•

Determine system goals

•

Establish Alternative ranking criteria

•

Develop alternative systems solutions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

•

Screen and rank alternatives

•

Iterate

•

Action and deployment

While a stepwise systems analysis is n o t appropriate in most cases, the spirit o f Gibson is that
these “steps” should serve as a guide to developing a complete and useful analysis.

In the first step o f Gibson’s methodology, goal development, Gibson recommends the
following seven steps:
• Generalize the question —Here, the systems analyst ileaves enough room to reframe
the problem after knowledge is gained through the iterative process.
• Develop a descriptive scenario —this is the development o f the system view. It
assumes that the same view is held by all and aid in the representation o f the system
• Develop a normative scenario — this establishes a minimum set of constraints by
questioning whether constraints are necessary
• Axiological component — Because the explicit cannot exist at a tacit level, a
developed solution in a particular context may not be transferable to a different
group with a different view o f the problem due to differing values and beliefs.
• Objectives tree —a graphical display o f the goals o f the system. It is used to critique
the organizational hierarchy o f the goals. Tree branches are additive to indicate how
higher-level goals may be achieved through the support provided by accomplishing
objectives.
• Validate —Through each step o f the goal development process, the system analyst
tries to validate and consolidate his findings. He is ultimately asking, “Is the problem
properly framed?”
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•

Iterate —go through the process again.

It is interesting to note that Gibson’s first step in accomplishing system analysis attempts to
mirror the ideology that a problem context should be developed. However, this is problematic
with the idea put forth in this paper, that the problem context should determine the
methodology to be used for the system analysis.

As stated earlier, a complex system has

emergent properties that are not clearly defined due the concept o f “system darkness”.
Gibson’s approach is rather prescriptive, lacking flexibility in this process with the assumption
that all stakeholders will share the same systems view. This prevents the development o f a
thorough understanding o f the system, as when the system is viewed from multiple
perspectives and as those perspectives merge, there is a better understanding o f the problem
situation and, therefore, the system problem becomes more contextually bounded by those
views.

Gibson’s next step in performing a systems analysis is to provide an alternative ranking criteria
based on an index o f performance. Accordingly Gibson has provided his ‘ideal’ characteristics
of that index:
Index o f Performance
•

Measurable

•

Objective

•

Non-relativistic

•

Meaningful

•

Understandable

The unanswered question relating to Gibson’s index o f performance characteristics is to what
purpose? The use o f these performance metrics is too limiting to achieve the intent o f the
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ranking o f alternatives.

They lack a means to identify a systematic way o f measuring the

suitability for the alternatives - a standard. The index o f performance, as put forth by Gibson,
provides minimal structure for the decision process and is biased to the value and belief system
o f the stakeholders and the systems analyst

In developing the alternative system solutions, Gibson provides little structure for the process.
Instead of the structured approach, as with his stepwise methodology, he encourages the
systems architect to be creative. The basis for this unstructured approach is apparent in the
built in control the stepwise methodology purports, that the ranking, based on the
performance indices will ‘screen’ unlikely or unviable alternatives.

The process o f iteration, in the Gibson methodology, provides focus for the system analysis.
It allows for ‘fine tuning’ o f the analysis process. Models function as recursive generators o f
predictions about the system. A model is necessarily simpler than the environment that it
represents, and this allows for it to run faster than, i.e. anticipate the actions, the processes in
the environment. This allows the system to compensate perturbations before they have the
opportunity to damage the system (Heylighen, et al, 1995). In much the same way, Gibson’s
process o f iteration allows for the analyst to reduce the alternatives to a manageable number
with the added benefit o f the ‘buy-in’ o f those interested parties involved with the process.

The final step in Gibson’s methodology is the action and deployment o f the solution(s).

Gibson makes a great contribution the body o f system methodologies. He has provided a
structured approach that organizes the problem, recognizes the problem’s context, has
consideration for the values and beliefs (axiological component) o f the interested parties, is
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iterative, and takes an intelligent approach to problem solving. However, caution should be
used in the application o f this methodology, as with others, the system, the context o f the
problem, and the environment that houses both should determine the use o f a particular
methodology. N o one methodology is better than any other when it comes to system analysis.
It is a matter o f “fit” between the contextually rich interrelationships o f the system, the
problem context and the methodology. A big mistake that systems architects are prone to
make is to follow a stepwise progression through a particular methodology because they are
comfortable with it. The system and problem context must “choose” the methodology, not
the other way around.
•

Methodology selection. W hat is the methodology(ies) that best fit the situation? How
was that determined and by who?

•

Application o f the methodology. Was the methodology(ies) selected properly applied
in the analysis o f the system?

•

Development o f a systems model. The model should be an abstract o f the system
under study. T o what level o f detail was the model developed?

•

Goodness o f Fit. By “goodness o f fit” we try to identify the rich contextual
relationships between the methodology used by the systems architect to study the
system and the problems identified by the problem context. This attempt should be
satisfying. Does the methodology used fit the problem and the system as developed in
the problem context and the system model?

•

Representation effectiveness. Does the model effectively and efficiently depict the
system and the complex interrelationships o f the system (interaction o f system with its
environment, interaction o f the subsystems)? Does the model identify gaps in our
knowledge o f the system?
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•

Limitations and assumptions for system representation. W hat are the assumptions and
limitations o f the model? W hat does/does n o t the model express?

Com plex System M odel D evelopm ent
Each individual’s ontological view o f the world tends to bias the perspective from which they
would observe the system. The level from which the observer views the system (Checkland,
1999) lays the foundation from which the researcher, as an observer, bases his assumptions.
The researcher’s viewpoint is predisposed due to the worldview he posses. While basic truths
may exist in the system as a whole, the viewpoint o f the observer is based on knowledge that
the observer has gained throughout his entire existence. He has developed a knowledge basis
from which he has tried to adapt to the given situation, which has resulted in the formation o f
his viewpoint o f the situation. That is to say that the system exists on many levels, but the
view from which it is to be observed, and the model developed, is dependent solely on the
observer.

This implies that the oversimplification o f a model results from a lack o f knowledge on the
part o f the observer. From a systems analysis viewpoint, simplification is not necessarily a bad
thing.
It clearly makes eminent sense to move onwardsfrom the simplest (least complex) available solution to
introducefurther complexities when and as — but only when and as - they areforced upon us. Simpler
(more systematicj answers are easily more codified, taught, learned, used, investigated, and so on. The
regulative principles o f convenience and economy in learning and inquiiy suffice to provide a rational
basisfor systematicity-preference. Ourpreferencefo r simplicity, uniformity, and systematicity in general,
is now not a matter of a substantive theory regarding the nature of the world, but one of a search
strategy — o f cognitive methodology. In sum we opt fo r simplicity (and systematicity in general) in
inquiry not because it is truth-indicative, but because tekologically more fffective in conducing to the
efficient realisation o f the goals o f inquiry. We look fo r the dropped coin in the lightest spots nearby,
not because this is - in the circumstances - the most probable location but because it represents the
most sensible strategy ofsearch: if it is not there, then wejust cannotfin d it at all (Rescher, 1998)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In general, the simple model is a manifestation o f what the researcher presumes to know, his
base approximation o f the system.

While this concept at first seems a little clouded, an

interpretation o f this concept is as follows: From the perspective that the system is viewed
(ontologicafly), a model is developed. There m ust be a base level o f knowledge about the
system to effectively engage in a systems-based initiative, which results in the development of
the initial framework o f the interrelations o f the system’s conceptual units (Checkland, 1999).
Through trial and error, the researcher gradually adjusts the model (problem solving expertise),
with each iteration, in an attempt to achieve a bridging o f the gap between the ideal outcomes
o f the system and the actual outcomes o f the system (gap —the problem domain). With each
iteration, knowledge is gained (epistemological part) as to the assumptions the researcher had
to make as he adjusted the model. The iterations themselves revealed to the researcher as to
whether his initial assumptions o f the unit’s interrelations were true or false.

Progressing

through the iterative process, the researcher is learning about the system and gaining
knowledge that did not previously exist.

As the researcher gains knowledge during this

process, it will become evident to the researcher that the model m ust then be reoriented to
reflect the new knowledge. The result is a more mature level o f systems knowledge compared
to the base knowledge the researcher began with. This mature knowledge will lead to a greater
understanding o f the actual system under study and more effective insight/resolution to the
disparity o f the ideal and actual system outcomes (gap closure).

Assuming that the model o f the system is a dynamic model, based on an iterative modeling
process, and given the ontological and epistemological view of a researcher attempting to
model a system for study, the following four points (as derived from the literature) are
proposed as a counter argument to the effects o f oversimplification o f a model.
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Point 1.

There is no perfect true ” model of any system. For a given system several models may exist
from an ontologically materialistic view) that may be adequate fo r solving the problem
situationfaced by the researcher.

Any systems model developed is based solely on the viewpoint o f the observer (Checkland,
1999). The observer’s base knowledge o f the system establishes the functional utility for the
framework o f the system com ponent relations in achieving systems goals (outcomes). As in
the ‘black box’ theory, numerous independent observers who are at consensus with the inputs
view the system and outputs o f the system, yet are in disagreement about the transformation
processes that occur within the system. As the researcher gains knowledge o f the diverse
communications and actions o f the units that comprise the system, an approximation o f the
true nature o f the system is developed, but is only an approximation. With multiple observers,
many diverse approximations will be developed; m ost will be quite different based only the
observers ontological view.

Point 2.

Acceptance o f the knowledge gained by the researcher will tend to be rejected i f it is
inconsistent with the bulk ofknowledgepossessed (base knowledge)prior to system study.

If an individuals) or group(s) evaluates a system model modified by a researcher after multiple
iterations, without the individual(s) or group(s) having the maturity in knowledge the
researcher has gained through the iterative process, a dysfunctional dynamic will exist between
the researcher and that individual/group (Gibson, 1991).

The individual/group lacks the

ability to effectively evaluate the model because it does not comprehend the system at the
same knowledge level the researcher is presenting in the “iterative” based model. In order for
the model to become acceptable, the individual/group must be brought up to the knowledge
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level o f the researcher through other means, else the knowledge gained by the researcher will
be lost on the individual/group expressing interest in the system o f study.

Point 3.

A systems based methodology is chosen to fi t the ontological and epistemological view of the
researchers “best f i t ” model.

How the researcher views the system is fundamental in

determining his approach to “problem solving”.

The model is only a conceptual representation o f the researcher’s approximation o f the system.
Does the model effectively and efficiendy depict the system and the complex interrelationships
o f the system (interaction o f system with its environment, interaction o f the subsystems)?
Does the model identify gaps in our knowledge o f the system? While these questions come to
mind when thinking about the model, the methodology m ust fit the problem context
(Guarino, 1995). In relation to the model, problem context is the perception o f the researcher
o f the gap between the ideal outcomes o f the system and the actual outcomes o f the system.
Again, the context (like the model developed) is a function o f the ontological view and base
knowledge o f the researcher.

Point 4.

Models are not static representations of the system being studied. Models will change as
knowledge is gained.

The model is an entity and representation o f the system under study. It is not the system itself.
The framework (base knowledge) and conceptual units o f the system created by the researcher
are an attempt to examine and explain system behavior (Checkland, 1999). As the iterations o f
the study progress, further knowledge is gained and the initial framework and conceptual units
must be altered to reflect this (Gibson, 1991).
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It is m ost important to note that the results o f a systems study are highly subjective and duly
apt to interpretation to those individuals who read them. A system study is intended for the
use o f the individuals) (or stakeholders) who perceive a problem with the actual outcomes of
the system as it was currently operating based on their individual perspective. The individual is
naturally biased in his/her perspective based on his/her own ontological stance. Even in the
reading o f the study, the interpretations and use o f the presented work is highly subjective and
innately dependent on the ontological and epistemological views o f the reader (Cocchiarella,
1996). As stated previously, acceptance will be based on knowledge individuals already posses.

Morgan introduced five approaches to lessen a similar paradox in the determination o f
research dilemmas faced in management science (in Gill and Johnson, 1991).

While the

underlying concepts are true in systems science, the concepts have modified here to more
appropriately correspond with systems science. The researcher should ask the following
questions about his analysis.

1. What was the intended use o f the body o f work produced by the researcher? Is the
work relevant to the problem?
2. W hat were the objectives o f the stakeholders? Were these objectives addressed in
the study?
3. W hat was the researcher trying to gain from the study o f the system? Did the study
produce a work that is usable by others to obtain their goals?
4. Were the limitations, assumptions, and judgments made by the researcher
consistent with the perspectives o f the stakeholders?
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5. D id the researcher “look outside the box” o f a particular methodology to
determine the best approach to the situation?

By attempting to keep those questions mindful, the researcher will address the concerns o f the
interpretation and use o f his work when applied to the system studied.

Reductionism vs. H olism
The concepts o f modeling and complex systems are then combined to form the arguments for
reductionism and holism as presented in figure 1. Systems, Cybernetics, and Complexity all
share an orientation towards the study o f organization o f phenomena in taking a “big picture”
perspective (Kuhn, 2002). From a holistic view, the system is observed in its entirety to study
‘complexes o f information and meaning’ such as patterns, configurations, processes, and types.
From a reductionistic view, an attempt is made to decompose complex activities and localize
the components within the complex system to provide a foundation for dynamical analysis
(Bechtel, 2001). These diametrically opposed views have been characterized (Ragin, 1989;
Verschuren, 2001) as the (holistic) case study as ‘case-oriented’, in contrast to a (reductionistic)
‘variable-oriented’ approach.

Often in research we can also describe them, respectively, as

qualitative and quantitative. Both theoretical frameworks share a base in scientifically derived
knowledge, an interest in understanding non-living (artificial/machine) and ‘living systems’,
and a belief that to more properly understand phenomena, a larger, more inclusive view is
necessary. Van Gelder (in Bechtel, 2001), for example, identifies homuncularity, the idea that
one can analyz'e systems into components, as allied with such notions as representation,
computation, and sequential and cyclic operation, all o f which he views as incompatible with
and supplanted by a dynamical approach. Efforts to decompose and localize processes are
often ridiculed [by holist] as reductionistic and conceived o f as unable to explain the operation
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o f complex systems. Recognizing that phenomena can be more properly understood as parts
o f systems also implies that the observer has the ability to delineate with some security the
proper systems an d /o r components o f systems implicated when investigating any specific
phenomena (Kuhn, 2002).

As engineers, scientist and researchers, decomposition o f a complex system into its subsystems
and elements for model development is an attempt to isolate variables that uniquely determine
the state o f the complex system under study. The reductionist has to make the assumption
that the holistic view o f the system that he has chosen to decompose is accurate and that the
variables that uniquely determine its state are known. In principle, the application o f such a
theory to real problems requires the simultaneous measurement o f all these variables. This is
rarely feasible in practice, where often we will not even know what the important variables are.
All that we may be able to achieve is to make a sequence o f repeated measurements o f one or
more observables. The relationship between such observations and the state of the system is
often uncertain. It is therefore unclear how much information about the behavior o f the
system we can deduce from such measurements (Stark, 2000).

In the true metaphysical application o f reductionism, as characterixed in the philosophical
literature, it may in fact be difficult to express the operation o f a complex system once it is
decomposed into its components, but from the ontological perspective o f a systems engineer
there is logic in the decomposition o f a large complex system. Reduction o f a system into its
base parts allows the researcher to achieve two goals, one being quantification the other being
able to establish researcher independence (Verschuren, 2001).
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Quantification allows for the establishment o f a metric means for measurement.

This

measurement allows for comparison o f the results o f the research, as well as replication and
control o f what the researcher has accomplished. Additionally, quantification allows for the
counting o f observation units having certain characteristics thus allowing for multi-variate data
analysis. Finally, the belief that quantitative research is more valid than qualitative research,
due to its subjectivity, lends to the widespread use o f quantitative research (Verschuren, 2001).

Moreover, a reductionistic type of data gathering may help achieve researcher-independent
results (Verschuren, 2001).

This would allow for systematic observation and quantitative

content analysis, rather than for participant observation and open-ended qualitative content
analysis. A final argument for reductionism is that the differentiation between research units
and observation units may act as a kind o f cross-validation.
A s most hypotheses come into being inductively as an overall impression of the researcher,
testing them in an inductive way ceterisparibus is weaker than doing this reductionistically.
For instance, imagine a researcherformulates the hypothesis that o f two groups the members
within group 1 interact significantly more than those o fgroup 2. Then looking at all dyads in
each group, counting the number and duration o finteractionsper dyad within a certain period
and summating over all dyads andperiods,fo r mostpeople will be more convincing as a test of
the hypothesis, than an overall impression of a researcher who observes these groups as wholes.
This confidence is based in large part on the fact that the researcher often has a number of
ideas and implicit assumptions as to the object of research. By looking at its elementaryparts
(i.e., observation units) instead of at the object as a whole, a professional researcher will
forget’ these assumptions and ideasfor the simple reason that these do not directly regard the
individualparts (Verschuren, 2001).

While reductionism on the surface appears to be a m ost valid means to approach to isolate the
variables necessary to understand a complex system, there are some limitations to the
reductionistic approach in building a model o f a complex system. There is a familiar idea that
the whole is more than the sum o f its parts. Petrinovich (1976) points to the major difficulty
with reductionism stemming from two sources: (1) it distorts the structure o f natural events,
and (2) it embodies a misleading conception o f the meaning o f individual differences. The
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first point refers to the fact that to use techniques such as analysis o f variance one must select
a range o f stimulus values in some arbitrary fashion, must choose a dependent variable to
measure that is arbitrary, and often limiting operational translation o f the conceptual variables
in which the in which the experimenter is interested and must abstract the entire experimental
operation out o f a complex o f variables in which the behavior is embedded.

By separating the variables controlling the behavior from the fabric from which they are
embedded, the pattern o f correlations between variables as they exist in nature is destroyed.
Context dependencies, interconnectedness, and functionality are lost. “Because a cause was
taken to be sufficient for its effect, nothing was required to explain the effect other than the
cause.” (close parenthesis here?) Consequently, the quest for causes was environment free. It
employed what is now called ‘closed-system’ thinking’ (Ackhoff in Kuhn, 2001).

In

establishing the viability o f research surrounding the development o f the deconstruct
subsystem model,

acceptance o f the principle o f determinism is required.

This principle

implies that general laws exist which allows for the complete predictability o f behavior if
measurement is precise and if all relevant variables could be controlled. It also implies that the
system had been deconstructed such that the subsystem under observation is no longer
complex and completely understood.

Verschuren (2001) clarifies the second difficulty with reductionism, “In general not the sum o f
individual parts o f a system makes up an equilibrium, but the integrated whole o f a system.”
His statement alludes to the concept that without the holistic view, there is not a way to
determine how perturbations to the deconstruct subsystem model will effect the behavior o f
the complex system. This suggests that the knowledge gained by isolating the subsystem for
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study may not have a significant use in understanding the complex system’s response (macro)
to the stimulus introduced at the subsystem level (micro).

In order to reconcile the problem o f not being fully able to predict the behavior o f a complex
system through the development o f complete models with full predictive capability though
either holistic or reductionistic reasoning, the following assertions are put forth:
1. While important to establish a base knowledge level when studying a complex
system, system models do not represent the system but serve as an
approximation o f the system and current knowledge base o f the researcher.
2. Models o f complex systems require an iterative development process to allow
for variability inherent in complex systems and modifications due

to the

researcher’s knowledge.
3. Statistical and other quantification methods, used in conjunction with
reductionism to evaluate the behavior o f the subsystem, may not yield the
same results when applied at the system level.
4. Reductionism should be used in conjunction with holism to identify those
variables in the system, which control “meaningful proportions” o f the total
variance in behavior o f the complex system.
5. Predictions made from the use o f complex models will be probabilistic at best.

Knowledge M anagement
Whereas data is directly observable and measurable, knowledge is a statement about a
hypothesis. The process o f knowledge management is a means to develop the specification of
a meaningful likelihood function based on the notion o f probability (Singpurwalla, 2003) that
is useful to others experiencing similar queries into the state o f the hypothesis at varying
degrees. The combination o f knowledge with related data creates information that may be used
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to support or reject the hypotheses that are generated.

Von Hoffman (1999) defines

knowledge management as a formal process of
KNOWLEDGE

DATA

figuring out what information a company has
that could benefit others with in the company,
then devising ways o f making it easily available.

INFORMATION

As knowledge is an important strategic asset
Figure 2, Relation of Knowledge
to Data and Information.

for organizations that leads to improved
organizational performance, so it reasons that

knowledge management must be concerned with many processes aimed at designing and
managing these process as effectively as possible.

While this idea sounds simplistic at first, it is necessary to discuss the two distinct but very
different dimensions o f knowledge that have a profound impact on the ability o f an
organization to capture that knowledge and make it available —ta d t and explicit knowledge
(Polanyi, 1967). O ne dimension emphasizes the capability to help create, store, share, and use
an organization’s explidtly documented knowledge. Explidt knowledge is very formal and
systematic, it can be easily communicated and shared, in product spedfications, in sdentific
formula or a computer program (Nonaka, 1991). As such, sdence and engineering are forms
o f organized [explidt] knowledge — a collection o f hypotheses in some logical manner
(Singpurwalla, 2003).

Often explicit knowledge is readily available to all within the

organization. The strategy for this dimension emphasizes codifying and storing knowledge.
Typically, knowledge can be codified via information technology (Lee & Kim, 2001; Swan,
Newell, and Robertson, 2000). Codified knowledge is more likely to be reused. The emphasis
is on completely specified sets o f rules about what to do under every possible set o f
circumstances (Bohn, 1994). Then management o f explicit knowledge is similar to the m odem
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library system, in that the organizations explicit knowledge is collected, stored and made
readily available to those who need to access i t The true need for knowledge management
arises from the need for use o f the second type o f knowledge that exists -tacit knowledge.

Tacit knowledge is highly personable and it is hard to formalize and communicate (Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1995). Michael Polanyi (1967) expresses the concept well: “We can know more
than we can tell.” As such, tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in an individual’s commitment to
a specific context —a craft or profession, a particular technology or product market, or specific
activities of a work group or team. Tacit knowledge falls within the realm o f an individual’s
holistic perspective as it relates to the cognitive dimension that the expert seemingly takes for
granted, and therefore cannot easily articulate them. As per this dimension, the strategy uses
dialogue through social networks including occupational groups and teams (Swan et aL, 2000).
It helps share knowledge through person-to-person contacts (Hansen et al., 1999). This
strategy attempts to acquire internal and opportunistic knowledge and share it informally
(Jordan & Jones, 1997). The existence o f tacit knowledge for use in knowledge management
however, gives the foundation for the development o f explicit knowledge based on tacit
knowledge: Knowledge can be obtained from experienced and skilled people.

In its purest context, knowledge management is much more than the generation o f a
contextual database o f knowledge that is gathered by an organization and stored for later use.
It involves the exploration o f the four distinct patterns o f knowledge creation and exploits
them enabling organization to further its objectives (Polanyi, 1967; Nonaka, 1991; Choi and
Lee, 2002).
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Tacit to Tacit
(Socialization)

Explicit to
Explicit
(Combination)
Tacit to Explicit
(Externalization)
Explicit to Tacit
(Internalization)

An individual shares tadt knowledge with another. For example, an apprentice leams form a
master through observation, imitation and practice. Skills learned become part of the
individual’s tadt knowledge base, becoming ‘socialized’ into the craft being learned. In such
a fashion, it is a limited form o f knowledge creation because as in the example the master
and apprentice never gain insight into the craft knowledge. Because the knowledge never
becomes explicit, it cannot be shared by the organization as a whole.
Because the knowledge is explicit, it can readily be disseminated through the organization.
The knowledge can then be combined with other explidt or tadt knowledge creating new
knowledge that the individual may use. While new knowledge may be created in this form,
this combination does not really extend the organizations knowledge base.
The process o f articulation (converting tacit knowledge to explidt knowledge) allows for the
sharing o f tacit knowledge throughout the organization
As a result o f new knowledge, a better cross-section if individuals within the organization
may begin to internalize explidt knowledge allowing them to broaden, extend and reffame
their individual tadt knowledge.
Table 1, Knowledge Creation Patterns, adapted from Nonaka, 1991.

The problem for knowledge management then becomes how to articulate the tacit knowledge
to a more useful explicit form for dissemination to the organization.

Expert Knowledge E licitation
Since a great deal o f knowledge is tacit, one way to To model the system, the concept of
reductionism is key to reducing the system to its base components. However, to understand
the rich interactions o f the system, to minimize the effects o f “system darkness” that is limiting
the overall context in which the system is operating, understand the ability o f the system to
compensate for the various perturbations resulting from the system subcomponents failures
and determine the human capability to repair or realign the system to minimize their effects, a
holistic perspective must also be deployed. O ne way to develop a holistic perspective is to
capture the [tacit] knowledge held by various experts on the system and integrate that
knowledge into the system model (Rush and Wallace, 1997; Baecher, 2002; Checkland, 1999;
Gibson, 1991).

The key to any knowledge-based system is the integrity o f the process, which elicits and
represents the human expertise on which the system is based (Rush and Wallace, 1997).
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Baecher (2002) defines the quantification o f expert opinion in the form o f judgmental
probabilities as expert elicitation. The process o f knowledge elicitation (Rush and Wallace,
1997) must define two essential items:

1. The core concepts or components o f the decision situation, and

2. The manner in which these components interact with each other.

The literature suggests that there are a variety o f knowledge elicitation techniques that may be
used for this purpose as detailed in table 2.

Technique
Brainstorming
Delphi Method

Consensus Decision
M aking

Description
Encourages idea generation; expands approach
through creativity
Structured sharing for gaining group consensus;
useful for assimilating knowledge/opinions

Uses consensual group dynamics to enhance the
knowledge acquisition process

Organizes experts as nominal group functioning
independendy (structured approach to
brainstorming)
AKA Think Aloud, participants are taught to
Protocol Analysis
think aloud as they solve a problem, provides
rich description of the individual’s analytical
process
Reclassification/ Goal Participant describes goals or outcomes. Works
with an analyst to define the events evidence or
Decomposition
scenarios that would support the desired
outcome.

Nominal Group
Technique

Reference
Moore, 1987
Van Gundy, 1988
Linstone and
Turnoff, 1975
Roth and Wood,
1990
McGraw and
Harbison-Briggs,
1989
Van Gundy, 1988
Frank, 1982
Huseman, 1973
Newell and Simon,
1972
Ericsson and Simon,
1984
Cordingley, 1989

Table 2, Knowledge Elicitation Techniques, adapted from Medsker, et al (1995) and
Hoffmann et al (1995).

Protocol Analysis (Newell and Simon, 1972 and Ericsson and Simon, 1984) and
Reclassification/ Goal Decomposition (Cordingley, 1989) require each expert to work
independently and closely with the researcher. There is evidence, however, that supports the
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use o f multiple experts to reduce the bias resulting from the beliefs o f an individual. Lock
(1987) notes that consensus distribution formed by combining the qualified degrees o f beliefs
by experts is shown to frequendy out perform individual experts in forecasting.

Specific

examples o f consensus methods include brainstorming, nominal group technique, and the
Delphi Method. Accordingly, Turban and Tan (1993) note the following benefits o f using
multiple experts.

1. O n the average, a group will make fewer mistakes than single experts
2. Several experts in the group can often reduce, or eliminate the need for a world class
expert
3. The collective expertise o f multiple experts will often be broader and deeper than that
o f a single expert.
4.

Often the simultaneous consideration o f the experts’ thoughts will result in deeper
insight into the problem at hand.

The group may serve to enhance individual commitment, help with resolving ambiguous and
conflicting knowledge, and facilitate creativity along with watchfulness for errors.

The underlying theme o f the literature suggest as supported by Baecher (2002) is that a
successful process for eliciting expert judgment m ust include the following steps:
1. Decide on the general uncertainties o f the probabilities o f which need to be assessed.
2. Select a panel o f experts displaying a balanced spectrum o f expertise about the
unidentified uncertainties.
3. Refine issues in discussions with the panel, and decide on the specific uncertainties the
probabilities o f which need to be assessed.
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4. Expose the experts to a short training program on concepts, objectives, and methods
o f elicitation judgmental probability, and on common errors that people make when
trying to quantify probability.
5. Elicit the judgmental probabilities o f individual experts on issues pertinent to heir
individual expertise
6. Allow the group o f experts to interact, supported by a facilitator, to explore
hypotheses, points o f view, and quantified estimates o f probability, toward the goal of
aggregating probabilities and resolving the breadth o f opinion.
7.

Document the

specific process used to

elicit judgmental probabilities and

communicate the results back to the panel of experts.

Structured Approach to System Behavior Analysis
In order to determine the general probabilities o f the system behaviors to be addressed, it also
becomes apparent that there is a need to develop a structured approach to the elicitation o f the
knowledge. Again, the literature suggests a variety o f methods that may be incorporated to
focus the experts in a manner that will structure the process to provide the necessary focus
while allowing the expert to view the system in a broad holistic manner. This provides a
structure to the decomposition or reduction o f the complex system for analysis o f the
anticipated or possible system perturbations that may occur. [Table 3]

In effect, a structured behavior analysis approach when applied to the system, supplies a
framework for the representation o f the data rather than the data collection. This abstract
framework (Cooke, 1994) assumes particular types o f structures or components (e.g. Actions,
functions, rules) as well as their relationships to one anther (e.g. hierarchical). While many o f
the techniques are highly graphic (e.g. time line analysis, fault trees, diagram drawing) they
enable illustration and make more vivid relationships among the elements in the system
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(Miester, 1985) and the interaction o f the personnel in contact with the system. Another form
o f structure that is also used is the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Like the
highly graphic techniques discussed, the FMEA establishes a hierarchical structure for the
behavior of the system in response to failure o f subsystems and components. It is suggested in
the literature (Cooke, 1994, McGraw and Harbison-Briggs, 1989) that use o f these types of
structural techniques may be used to handle multiple experts in that the relatedness estimates
that are used as input can be aggregated over a number o f experts to generate a composite
structural representation o f the system and its behavior in response to stimuli.

Technique
T im e lin e
Analysis

Description
The analyst determines time critical
sequences o f tasks using the informant's
definition o f the temporal relationships
o f tasks.

References
McGraw and HarbisonBriggs, 1989
Meister, 1986
Stammers, et al, 1990

Failure Modes
and Effects
Analysis

The analyst determines what errors might
occur in the informant's domain and
what the consequences o f such errors
would be to the system

Henley and Kumamoto, 1981
Kirwan and Rea, 1986
Parry, 1986
Rasmussen, et al, 1981

Fault Trees

The analyst develops a fault tree that
decomposes an undesired event into
causal events and errors.

Green, 1983
Henley and Kumamoto, 1981
Parry, 1986
Veseley, et al, 1981

Information Flow
Analysis

The analyst develops a flow chart o f the
information and decisions required to
carry out the system's functions. The
informant reviews and corrects the
diagram.

Mancuso and Shaw, 1988
Meister, 1989
Stammers, et al, 1990

Diagram Drawing

The analyst draws a diagram representing
processes in or states o f the informant's
domain. Possible formats include flow
charts, activity charts, and system state\
action state diagrams

Fisher, et al, 1990
Hall, et al, 1994
Geiwitz, et a l, 1988
Bainbridge, 1979

Table 3, Structured Approaches for System Behavior Analysis,
adapted from Cooke, 1994.
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Sum m ary
A summary o f the literature shows that there are various approaches to the development o f
models that can approximate the behavior o f a complex system. Various techniques were
presented as methodologies for developing the complex system model. Each technique
involves, to greater or lesser degrees, the concept o f the reduction o f the system to its base
components for simplification o f the model o f the system. The major theme in the literature
was that, while these simple models approximate the complex system’s behavior, the model
itself was not a true representation o f the complex system, but an approximation o f the
variables viewed from the observer’s ontological stance.

There appeared to be a gap in the literature in describing a methodology that allows for a
holistic view o f the rich interaction o f the complex system’s subsystems and components once
the system is deconstructed in to its basic elements. There is documentation in the literature
for the development o f “expert” systems models. The gap that forms the basis for this
research is the lack o f a methodology that shows that the knowledge o f the interactions o f the
system can be derived from the system experts tacit knowledge and incorporated into the
complex system model for a legacy complex system to better aid in the predictability o f that
system’s propensity for failure.
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CHAPTER

I II

CONCEPTUAL M ODEL

Introduction
This chapter completes the literature funnel by introducing the maintenance context that the
conceptual model must address. The conceptual model then addresses how both a
reductionistic perspective and a holistic perspective can be gained from the model put forth
through the use o f expert knowledge in the development o f a modified FMEA at the systems
level.

Maintenance
Deshpande and Modak (2003) define maintenance as ensuring that [a] physical asset continues
to fulfill its intended function. These functions o f the assests and its desired standards o f
performance define the objectives o f maintenance with respect to any asset. Very few systems
are designed to operate without maintenance o f any kind, and for the most part they must
operate in environments where access is very difficult, or where replacement is more
economical than maintenance (Lewis, 1994). Increasing complexity in design and high levels
o f automation has made detection o f failure and repair o f equipment more difficult (Robinson,
1987; Paz and Leigh, 1994; and Swanson, 2001). High levels o f capital intensity associated with
many systems have placed greater pressure on the maintenance function to rapidly repair
equipment and prevent failures from occurring (Collins and Hull, 1986; Swanson 2001).

There are three classes o f maintenance schemes: corrective, preventive and predictive
(Swanson, 2003; Yang, 2001). Corrective maintenance occurs after a system has failed and
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repair to the system is necessary. Preventative maintenance involves the replacement o f parts,
adjustments to the system or changes to the system to improve the reliability o f the system and
prevent failure by staving off the effects o f system aging. Predictive maintenance requires the
assessment o f the system by a system expert and unscheduled maintenance to prevent the
possibility o f the failure based on unrevealed system problems.

While time-based and M TTF practices are based on a window o f opportunity and on the
likelihood o f a failure occurring during a specific time in the systems lifecycle in preventative
maintenance (Lewis, 1994), predictive maintenance generally requires that technical experts
evaluate the system in its entirety. Predictive maintenance is less costly than [corrective]
emergency or preventive maintenance and results in less down time to perform adjustments,
repair, and cleaning, when the established metric reaches a predetermined point, is scheduled
with no disruption o f the operation (Westerkamp, in Maynard 2001).

Often referred to as condition-based maintenance (Yang, 2002), predictive maintenance is
initiated in response to a specific equipment condition. However it is that assessment o f the
condition over time that requires an expert evaluation based on the expert’s experience with
the equipment being maintained. In effect the experts are making reliability predictions o f the
system from a top down perspective o f the system based on similar experience with like
systems w’hose reliability is known to the exerts, rather than from the base parts level.
According to O ’Connor (1995) this type o f predictive schema is one that is likely to be attained
only if there is human commitment to it.

The literature presented in Chapter 2 suggests that an expert knowledge based, predictive
maintenance system is feasible. This type o f maintenance schema may be applied to quantify
the system operability over a given time period to determine the need for assessment o f the
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system, based on the collective knowledge o f system experts, on the reliability o f the system
components and the ability o f repair by the system’s technicians.

A methodology that establishes a relationship between the knowledge base tightly held by the
system experts, the data captured in the maintenance history o f the complex system, and the
behavior of the system was not prevalent in the literature. By establishing the relationship, a
better determination may be made for the need for assessment o f the entire system by experts
to reveal potential unforeseen failures. Potential advantages o f such a methodology are:

•

Cost savings - Costs associated with the use o f technical experts shifted to general
maintenance personnel

•

Reduction in failures - identifies possible causes o f impending failures to warn of
failure before it occurs

•

Mission availability —decreases the time necessary to take system out o f service for
unnecessary assessments

C onceptual M odel
In studying the complex maintenance system, and development o f a model that approximates
the system, the system m ust be decomposed to the basic failure sequences that are intended
for study. However, this reduction in the system to its base components is not enough to
understand the interactions o f the system with its environment, nor does it provide the
necessary picture o f how the system and its human interface compensate to perturbations on
the system. The systemic model must then include a component that addresses the hoEstic
perspective o f the system.
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Reducitonistfc Sjstem Model I

Figure 3, Conceptual Model for Maintenance System Analysis.

Developm ent o f the R eductionistic System M odel
The concept o f a Reductionistic Model is consistent with Stark (2000) and Verschuren (2002)
in that the system must be reduced to its base components to allow for the necessary
documentation o f the system variables for scientific research to occur. The procedure used is
based on COMNAVSURFLANT Proactive Maintenance Procedures Handbook (AMSEC
LLC, 2003). The procedure presented allows for reductionism to establish the components
contained with in a system to be studied, and the identification o f failure modes. The
procedure was reviewed and is consistent with the literature.

The first step in the development o f the Reductionistic System Model is defining the system
and its physical and functional boundaries. In this way a focused analysis can be accomplished.
Expanding the boundaries too wide defeats the purpose o f the study by introducing too many
variables. The system definition is accomplished in three parts:
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•

Determine and verify the system component block diagram

•

Determine and validate the system functional block diagram

•

Create system functional top breakdown (TDBD) diagram.

The second step is equipment verification and validation. This requires the comparison o f the
configuration

data

(inventory

and

parts

from

the

maintenance

system

for

the

repair/replacement o f system components) to the functional TDBD. The result o f this
comparison is the creation o f an inventory matrix o f the com ponent

partso f the system.

Discrepancies are resolved with site visits to the system or platform under question

for

validation and verification o f the existence o f the components under question.

The final step in the Reductionistic System Model is the development o f the system functional
description and failure definitions. The greatest difference in the development o f this portion
o f the system model departs from conventional maintenance thinking is the realization that
component failure does not equate to system failure as the system or sub system may have
inherent redundancies that can compensate for the failure o f a single component. Failure of
system function is the focus o f this step in development o f the system model. The three major
phases in this analysis is the development of:

•

System functional description

•

System functional failure definition and,

® The development o f a system functional failure matrix.

This resultant is the structured failure matrix that allows the query o f system experts on the
behavior o f the system as the result o f a potential failure.
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H olistic Perspective
The literature suggests that the use o f FM EA (Failure mode and effects analysis) (US MIL-Std1629A, 1980/1984) as a means to develop a knowledge basis (Barkai, 1999; Wirth et ai,
1996;Yacoub and Ammar, 2002; Goossens and Cooke, 1997) to model the system. While
Goossens and Cooke along with Yacoub and Ammar use the m ethod as a means to identify
potential risk in system failure in the design o f complex systems, W irth et al and Barkai elude
to the use o f the FEMA to generate diagnostic expert systems and knowledge-based support
o f systems analysis.

Most o f the current FM EA literature focuses on use o f FMEA with concurrent system design.
Design FMEA is a standardized technique widely used in the automotive, aerospace and other
industries that is used to identify prioritize and eliminate known and potential failures,
problems and errors from systems under design before product release (Bowles, 1998; Lee,
2001) [Table 4].
T ask
Build FEMA Model Structure
Score and Prioritize

Decide and Act

M ethod
Elaborate ‘causal’ chain failure dependencies;
(Causes > Failure Modes > Effects)
Assess Risk Priority Numbers (RPN);
(failure frequency * end-effect severity *
detection difficulty)
Optimize design improvements, tradeoffs,
test plans, manufacturing changes, etc.

Table 4, Design FMEA, adapted from Lee (2001).

Traditionally, this model is used to focus limited design resources on critical design tradeoffs
and decisions leading to improved reliability, quality and safety (Stamatis, 1995). This iterative
process is often used to influence design by identifying failure modes, assessing their
probabilities o f occurrence and their effects on the system, isolating their causes, and
determining corrective action or preventative measures (Ebeling, 1997).
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The systems under study for this research effort are at maturity levels that preclude this as a
viable option to establish redesign parameters, however it appears that the use o f this tool at a
higher level to establish a knowledge base to elicit expertise in the system areas that are to be
addressed will be invaluable. Development o f a FMEA for each system uniquely particular to
the class to which it belongs will vary dependant on the stage o f the system’s lifecycle. The
primary application o f FMEA in this instance is to translate a set o f qualitative relationships
that exist in the complex system, based on the widely held beliefs o f the system stakeholders,
into a quantitative data set (RPN —risk priority number).

A system level FMEA is a structured process to identify potential failures and the effect o f
these failures on system performance. The RPN is a critical factor, which considers equipment
complexity, mission needs, performance criteria, redundant assets, consequences o f failures,
safety, legislated requirements and other comparable salient criteria. An RPN is developed by
the selected technical/system experts to determine the relative impact o f each failure mode o f
the FMEA. For this evaluation the RPN looks at three areas:

1.

How often a Failure Mode is likely to occur

2. The mission degradation an d /o r downtime it would cause

3. The level o f repair that would be needed to fix it

This is a departure from the tradition RPN design used in a research and development effort.
By evaluating these parameters in the development o f the RPN, the result yields a perspective
not only on the physical system as initially designed, it incorporates the context in which the
complex system exists within its environment, the rich interaction o f the system on the meta
system within which it exists, the interaction o f the human with the physical environment o f
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the system and its effect on the system readiness via maintenance capability o f personnel
assigned to the system.

The RPN may then be used as a management decision support tool that contributes to
determination o f the appropriate assessing activity for a system. Assignment o f assessments to
the organizational level are made only when the following conditions are met:

1. Required assessment skills are within standard technical capability o f the
maintenance personnel

2. Requisite test equipment and assessment procedures are readily available

High RPNs indicate potential failures, which have a major system performance impact.
Assessments for high RPN failures are assigned to technical experts. Assessments for lower
RPN failures, which tend to have relatively m inor system performance impact, can be assigned
to the system’s maintenance personnel.

Before assigning an assessment to system’s

maintenance personnel the methodology confirms through an iterative process and dialogue
with the technical experts that the required assessment skills are within standard technical
capability o f the maintenance personnel; the requisite test equipment and assessment
procedures are readily available; and potential equipment failure will not create a safety hazard.

The predictive maintenance schema is now m ore narrowly focused toward the use o f technical
expertise only on those failure modes that dictate through the resultant high RPN.

Sum m ary
The use o f both the Reductionistic and Holistic perspectives can capture the complexities o f a
legacy system. Reducing the complex system to its base components to model the failure
modes provide sufficient structure for the development o f a holistic approach to quantify the
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experts knowledge. The presentation o f the conceptual model allows for the use o f the
knowledge held by the experts by management in a manner that may be used to base decisions
on whether assessment o f the system is warranted.
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CHAPTER

IV

RESEAR C H M E T H O D O L O G Y

Introduction
Before discussing the research methodology used in this effort, it is important to reiterate the
problem statement, introduce the population details o f the study and restate the research
question prior to the discussion o f the methods that will be used to test the conceptual model.

Frequently, large-scale maintenance o f complex systems (i.e., a naval vessel) is based on the
reduction o f the system to its base subcomponents and the use o f manufacturer-suggested,
time-directed, preventative maintenance, which is augmented during the systems lifecycle with
predictive maintenance which assesses the systems ability to perform its mission objectives.
This maintenance scheme ignores the complexity o f the system it tries to maintain.

By

combining the base components or subsystems into a larger system, and introducing human
interaction with the system, the complexity o f the system creates a unique entity that cannot be
completely understood by basing predictability o f the system to perform tasks on the
reduction of the system to its subcomponents.

This chapter discusses the application o f the conceptual model and the methods used in the
deployment o f the model in the controlled research environm ent Hypotheses are put forth
for the test o f the model to predict the behavior o f the system based on the holistic
perspective o f the experts. To evaluate the experts, a comparative is used that is based on
historical records.
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Scope o f study
The conceptual model, as described in the pervious chapter, includes a variety o f applications
and approaches (e.g. Complex system modeling, the use o f FMEA in maintenance practices,
expert elicitation for model development). To test all these is beyond the scope o f this
dissertation. Furthermore, it is possible that the methodology presented will have different
effectiveness for:
•

Differences in system type

•

System size

•

Technical nature o f the system

•

Human interactions with the system

•

Availability o f data regarding the system

•

And others

A population must be selected which will control for these factors, or these factors m ust be
addressed in the analysis. In this research effort the first approach will be used. Several
delimitations have to be made which will allow the problem to be constrained sufficiently. For
purposes o f this research and to test the model, the Low Pressure and Medium Pressure Air
Compressor (LP-MPAC) systems on various ship platforms will be used. The LP-MPAC
systems were selected, as previous work was available to support the research. This research
will make use o f previously collected data to test the use o f the holistic modeling portion o f the
conceptual model. COMNAVSURFLANT has previously developed a guideline for the
development o f the theoretical modes o f failure for their ship systems. Application o f this
guideline will aid in the selection o f and development o f the reductonistic systems model and
will provide structure for testing the research hypothesis.
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Research Question
Based on the literature discussed in the previous section, tools like FMEA exist to assist in the
design o f systems. Little or no methodology is apparent with respect to the decision process
that encompasses the application o f corrective actions for existing systems accounting for the
degradation o f the system, overtime, based on knowledge tightly held by system experts. The
question to be answered by this research is: can a methodology that uses the expert knowledge,
elicited from system experts through a high level FMEA, be used to create a knowledge based
decision support system to aid in the assessment o f legacy systems?

Population Details
Overview of S E M A T II Process
The Systems and Equipment Material Assessment Team (SEMAT II) visit is a condition based
assessment program for hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) systems and equipment This
visit occurs simultaneously with the C5RA (a combat systems, command, control,
communications and computer readiness, condition based assessment program).

Current

policy is to move toward the consolidation o f redundant inspections and assessment visits to
improve the availability o f ships for deployment. SEMAT II visits are designed to be twoweek visits comprised o f civilian, military and contractor field service engineers to assess
onboard equipment, offer technical repair expertise and provide deck-plate level training to
ships personnel

Scheduled on a once per maintenance cycle basis, the visit occurs four to six months prior to
deployment following ships major availability for shipyard repair and overhaul. The visit is in
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support o f a US Navy move toward a condition based maintenance program rather than a
time directive maintenance program. Figure 4 contains the ship maintenance cycle and the
position o f SEMAT II in that process.

Ship M aintenance Cycle
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Figure 4, Ship Maintenance Schematic, source:
COMNAVSURFLANT internal docum ent

The cost o f performing the SEMAT II/C 5R A assessment and time limiting factors are
compelling reasons to move toward an effective, knowledge/information-based, reliability
system using a structured decision process and the data available from the Ships 3-M OARS
system.

U se o f Secondary Data
The existence of historical failure data allows for a benchmark for the research from which a
conclusion may be drawn. This gives internal validity to the research, and a standard to provide a
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means of measure. To test the conceptual model, it will be necessary to uses secondary data from
existing historical databases.

What is secondary data? Data may be described as primary or secondary. The researcher himself
collects primary data. Secondary data is often collected by others and "re-used" by the researcher.
The process o f research involves some consideration of previous work in the same field. All
researchers read and use the research of others. In the same way that it is possible for a researcher
to review the previous work in any field and still go on to carry out original work, it is possible for
a researcher to carry out a secondary analysis and still go on to carry out original work (Gorard,
2002). Secondary data analysis is being used extensively in many fields such as astronomy, highenergy physics, the genome project, statistics, economics, and psychological health surveys
(Church, 2001; Keller and Warrack, 1997; Cooper and Schindler, 1998). Secondary data is a viable
resource to aid the research process.

Speed and cost are the most obvious advantages o f using secondary data. Since the data already
exists, it is by definition generally quicker to ‘collect’, involving less travel and minimal cost
(Gorard, 2002). Care should be taken when using secondary data, as errors may have been
introduced as a result of the transcription or due to misinterpretation of the original terminology
and definitions employed (Keller and Warrack, 1997).

Secondary data is generally used for three research purposes. First it fills a need for a specific
reference or citation on some point —perhaps in a research proposal, to demonstrate why the
proposed research fills a void in the knowledge base. It allows for a reference benchmark
against which to test other findings. Second, secondary data is an integral part o f a larger
research study or o f a research report to justify having bypassed the costs and benefits o f
doing primary research. Third, secondary data may be used as the sole basis for a research
study, since in many situations one cannot conduct primary research because o f physical, legal,
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or cost influences. Retrospective research often requires the use o f published data (Cooper and
Schindler, 1998).

In many studies the power o f secondary data is allied to the flexibility o f primary data
techniques. O ne way in which all studies can gain from integrating secondary data is to set the
context for the primary data. Even relatively large-scale data collection cannot compete in size
and quality with existing records, so re-analysis o f these records can be helpful in a variety of
ways. It can provide the figures for each stratafum] in a stratified sample (else how do you
know what proportions to use?).

It can be used to assess the quality o f an achieved

population. These figures can then be used to weight the sample if there is a clear basis in its
composition. Contextual secondary data can also be used to ague that a problem exists to be
solved by other techniques, and to begin to describe the nature o f that problem. (Gorard,

2002)

The most important limitation o f secondary data sources is that the information may not meet
your specific needs. Others have collected source material for their own purposes. Operational
definitions will differ and may not be available for evaluation, units o f measure are different,
and different times may be involved or environmental stimuli may not be compatible. It may
be difficult to assess the accuracy o f the information because one knows little about the
research design or the conditions under which the research occurred, unless the agent who
collected the data is impeccably credentialed and has documented the procedures. (Cooper and
Schindler, 1998) The investigator is dependent on other researchers’ decisions regarding the
population, sampling design, and measures used in data collection. Consequently, researchers
must accept the limitations o f the data set or not use that data set. Second, whatever measures
were collected are the only ones for use.

Each investigator m ust decide if the included
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measures are adequate and sufficient to answer the research question. (Mainous and Hueston,
1997)

Because not all data that comes from secondary sources is valid, O rm rod and Leady (2001)
submit that one means o f reducing the use o f defective data is that there be a criteria for the
admissibility o f data. This issue has heightened importance in secondary data analysis because
the investigator was not involved in the data collection (Mainous and Hueston, 1997). It is
further compounded from the aspect that the secondary data may come from various sources
that had a variety o f collection methods. Therefore, to ensure the integrity o f the research,
standards for the acceptance o f the secondary data needs to be established from the outset.

Specifically in this age o f ‘data-mining’ from large databases, that the researcher has little
control over the data that has been entered, it is critical that the process through which the
data is to be elicited from the database is documented, clearly and stringently, to remove
possible bias in the resulting data set. This process for the development o f associative rules
must, like the development o f a complex system model, be an iterative process and must fit
the context o f the research methodology. Data and methodology are inextricably
interdependent (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).

In the development o f the associative rules necessary to extract data from the database, the use
of linguistic terms in a top down mining algorithm allows for the a progressively deepening
approach to finding large interest item sets (Hong et al, 2003). Agrawal et al. (1993) propose
several mining algorithms based on the concept o f large item sets.

In their research, the

mining process was divided into two phases. In the first phase, candidate item sets were
counted by scanning the database. If the data set was larger than a predefined threshold then
the item set was determined a large item set. Item sets containing single items were processed
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first, large item sets were re-mined and filtered to reduce redundancies in the data entry and
then segmented based on confidence intervals.

It is important to note that these procedures for defining the item set mirrors the concepts
developed in systems model development. The systems architect should begin by addressing
the what (system), how (sub-systems) and why (the wider-system or system environment) o f
the problem context (Checkland, 1999). The problem context developed is meant to give the
systems architect a means to clearly identify the system that is to be studied. By casing an
initial wide net, and through an iterative process, the researcher can accomplish the task o f
collecting a valid data set from the database. By using the existing structure o f the operational
system being studied for the research effort, a part-of-hierarchy may be developed that
provides the linguistic filter necessary got capture the appropriate data from the initial data
repository- wide scan; this can be used to aid in the development o f the filtering algorithms
necessary to eliminate unsuitable data. The researcher must ultimately decide what data
resulting from this process must be willingly omitted, and document the reasons for omissions.

By administering the process in a consistent, well-documented manner, that resultant
secondary data yielded from this filtration, has validity that has been gained through the
stringently documented, consistent process established by the researcher prior to the mining o f
the data. Appendix E details the development o f the secondary data used to validate the
conceptual model.

T est o f Hypothesis
This test may be preformed in a variety o f ways. However for simplicity, the first test o f the
hypothesis will be a comparison o f the consensus generated by the expert FMEA and the
FMEA generated through historical data (figure 5) i.e. RPN E is equal to RPNH. This would
support the research question posed, “Can a methodology that uses the expert knowledge,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

elicited from system experts through a high level FMEA, be used to create a knowledge based
decision support system to stream line assessment o f legacy systems?” However, for this
question to be answered positively the RPN resulting from the expert could also be greater
than the RPN developed from the historical data set, i.e. RPN E is greater than RPNH. Having
an RPNE greater than or equal to RPN H would also imply that the expert judgment is more
holistic in its assessment o f the system, and that knowledge captured through the FMEA
process can form the basis o f a decision support system. Consequently the hypothesis
statement can be represented as:

H 0 :RPNE < RPNh

H x: R P N E > R P N H

(Hypothesis 1)

Reductionistic System Model

implication of Historical
Failure Data

Expert Knowledge EUcitotim

Holistic Perspective

Resulted RPN
(Expert Knowledge
Based))

Figure 5, Test o f Conceptual Model.
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The same reasoning may be applied to the independent factors o f the RPN m odelThe
independent factors will also be compared to the historical data, yielding the following
hypotheses to be evaluated by the research:
H 0 : SE < S H

H0 : RE < R H H0 : 0 E < 0 H

H x: S e > S h

H x:Re > R h H x:0 e > 0 h

(Hypothesis 2)

(Hypothesis 3) (Hypothesis 4)

It is expected that the factors will be greater in value from the experts due to their holistic
perspective o f the system under study.
Another hypothesis to be tested is “does a factor or factors exist that contribute to resulting
RPN in a greater proportion.” To test that hypothesis, the following hypotheses will also be
evaluated:
H 0 : S e *O e < S b * O h

H q :Re * S e < R h * Sh

H 0 :O e * R e < O h * R h

H x :SE * 0 E > S H * 0 H

H x :Re * S e > R h * $ h

H x :O e * R e > O h * R h

(Hypothesis 5)

(Hypothesis 6)

(Hypothesis 7)

Again it can be presumed that the expert having a more holistic view o f the system will devise
a greater value in the consensus due to their holistic view o f the system. The comparison o f
the expert to the historical RPNs provides an aggregation o f the differences between the
models. This allows for the reduction o f the need to assess failure modes in which the
historical and the expert are in concurrence and conserve resources to address the disparity
between the resultant RPNs to achieve greater efficiency in the overall assessment o f the
system being studied.

Selection of S tatistical T ech n iq u es
Siegel (1957) suggests that the choice among statistical test which might be used with a given
research design should be based on the these three criteria:
1. The statistical model o f the test should fit the conditions o f research.
2. The measurement requirement of the tests should be met by the measures used in the
research
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3.

From among those tests with appropriate statistical models and appropriate
measurement requirements, that test should be chosen which has the greatest power
efficiency.

Within the category o f inferential statistics, specific analytic techniques are classified as either
parametric or nonparametric. Parametric include such widely recognized tests as the Student’s t test
and the analysis of variance (ANOVA). Researchers using these and other parametric statistics
must test several assumptions with regard to the coding and distribution of the variables they are
studying. In most cases, parametric statistics require that data be normally distributed, that the
variance is equal (i.e., homogeneous) in the data set and the dependent variables be continuous in
nature, measured on either an interval or ratio scale (Fitzgerald et al, 2001)

Nonparametric techniques are generally used to test ranked data. Rather than testing to determine
whether the pi and \iz differ, it tests whether the population locations differ. Additionally, if the
data are non-normally distributed, t-tests are invalid. Nonparametric techniques may be used as
well in this instance.

In the selection of a measure to provide verification and validation of research data, various
statistical models were evaluated for use in this endeavor. Figure 6 provides the logic used in
choosing an appropriate statistical methodology.
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r - ■*---j
,

mi

1

Figure 6, adapted from Keller, IC and B. Warrack, Statistics fo r
Management and Economics, 4th Ed. (do not print in color)

Following the logic o f figure 6, it is noted that the statistical test model used will be a Wilcoxon
rank sum test, a nonparametric statistical test. There are obvious drawbacks to the use o f this
type

o f analysis.

Nonparametric statistical models are not as ridged as their parametric

counterparts.Therefore, the conclusions that may be drawn from them are more general in
nature when using them to elicit statistical inference. However, it allows for the use o f
hypothesis testing on data that is nonnormally distributed.

Additionally, appropriate

parametric techniques will be used to develop inference in the absence o f an appropriate non
parametric statistical method.

Detailed Research Approach
The Reductionistic System Model for the LP-MPAC, and the Historical Data used to populate
the

Statistical

RPN

Comparative,

was

developed

through

a

joint
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COMNAVSURFLANT, AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP Portsmouth and FTSCLANT.

For this

effort wherever the data used was from a secondary source, the procedure used to originally
collect the data has been reviewed for consistency with the conceptual model and the
literature. The necessary procedures for the collection o f the secondary data are abridged in
this narrative and data sources are provided for reference in Appendix E.

System Identification
Validation o f the conceptual model, as previously outlined, will be done using the Low
Pressure and Medium Pressure Air Compressor (LP-MPAC) systems on various ships in the
US Navy.

The Reductionistic System Model for the LP-MPAC, and the Historical Data used to populate
the

Statistical

RPN

Comparative,

was

developed

through

a

joint

effort

with

COMNAVSURFLANT, AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP Portsmouth and FTSCLANT.

The

method used to develop the Reductionistic System Model is documented in the
COMNAVSURFLANT Proactive Maintenance Procedures H andbook (AMSEC LLC, 2002).
The results o f the development o f the Reductionistic Model for the LP-MPAC are synopsized
from internal COMNAVSURFLANT documents (LP-MP Failure Mode Report, August
2002), for consistency in the research.

System D escription
The low-pressure air plant and systems supply air at required pressure for use in non-critical
ship service air systems (those systems which can tolerate and operate satisfactorily with
interruption o f the air service) and vital control air systems. In SURFLANT, medium
pressure air plants and systems typically supply air at required pressure for services and
equipment such as, but not limited to:
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1. Propulsion diesel starting
2. Diesel generator starting
3. Sea chest blow, whistle
4. Pneumatic clutch
5. Shaft brakes
Each low and medium pressure air plant is typically shipped from the manufacturer as a
“ skid ” mounted unit. Some o f these air plants have dehydrators and receivers m ounted on
the skid while others have these components installed downstream. For the purpose o f this
analysis, the study boundary for the low and medium pressure air plants will consist o f all
components, piping and associated controls between the air inlet up to and including any
dehydrators installed prior to an air receiver. The air receiver will be outside o f the study
boundary. The following major components are considered to be within the air plant study
boundary:

Electric drive m otor and m otor controller, drive gear or coupling, air

filter/silencer, compressor assembly, oil pump, moisture separators, dehydrators (LPACs
only), heat exchangers/ coolers, temperature and pressure sensors, associated gages, valves,
hoses and piping.

SURFLANT uses reciprocating compressors

(RCP-M)

for their medium pressure

compressed air plants and uses reciprocating (RCP-L), NAXI Rotary Helical Screw (RHS-N)
and STAR Rotary Helical Screw (RHS-S) compressors for their low-pressure compressed air
plants. The com ponent block diagrams for these air plants are illustrated in Figures 7, 8, 9
and 10.
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Figure 7, Component Block Diagram - Low Pressure Reciprocating
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Functional Diagram
The low and medium pressure air plants are used to supply air to shipboard low and medium
air pressure systems and to maintain the system pressure at the desired level. Ships in the
current Force have low pressure and medium pressure air plants rated at 100-150 PSI and
600 PSI respectively. A functional block diagram is presented in Figure 11.
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Figure 11, Low and Medium Pressure Air Plant Functional Block
Diagram, COMNAVSURFLANT internal document.
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F unctional T opdow n Breakdown
Figure 12 illustrates the relationship o f the various com ponents o f Low Pressure and
Medium Pressure Air Plants.
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Figure 12, Low and Medium Pressure Air Plant Functional Topdown Breakdown.
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Equipm ent Verification And Validation
An Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Analyst, with assistance from a D ata Analyst,
verified and validated equipment contained within the defined system. They inventoried and
documented the equipm ent/com ponents o f the system, comparing the developed
com ponent diagrams and the configuration data from the Maintenance Management
Information System (MMIS). Ship W ork Line Item N um ber (SWLIN) and Allowance Parts
List (APL).

This resulted in the creation o f a master matrix that allows segregation o f

discrepancies into APL and Unit Identification Code (UIC) or ship class specific data. This
matrix is used to determine the “bad actors” within the groups, cost and downtime
comparisons, etc. Additionally, this determined the relative accuracy/completeness o f the
configuration data in the MMIS. There are three phases to this step o f the process:
•

Compare configuration data to the com ponent block diagram comparison,

•

Perform site validation, if required,

•

Create inventory matrix / matrices.

Low and M edium Pressure Air Plant Population Data
In order to identify all applicable low and medium pressure air plants used in the Force, a
query was performed on the Ship Configuration and Logistic Support Information System
(SCLSIS) using the following Ship W ork Line Item Numbers (SWLIN):
•

55120 - Air System, Low and Medium Pressure

•

55121 - Air System, Low and Medium Pressure

•

55152 —Compressors, MP Air and

•

55153 - Compressors, LP Air
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This yielded a SURFLANT inventory o f all low and medium pressure air plants by APL,
ship class, hull number and compressor type Reciprocating (RCP), Rotary Helical Screw—
STAR (RHS-S), Rotary Helical Screw-NAXI (RHS-N). The data date was 29 March 2002.
The data used is n o t provided for reference due to military classification. During the
equipment verification and validation some discrepancies in the SCLSIS data were found.
Physical verification was performed. D ata was adjusted to reflect the results o f the physical
verification.

Functional D escription/Failure D efinition
System Functional Failure is the inability o f a system to meet a specified performance
standard. A complete loss o f function is clearly a functional failure, as is the inability to
perform at the minimum level defined as satisfactory. All functional failures are n o t equal,
because they do not have equal effects on the mission or safety o f the ship. To accomplish
this step o f the process, it is necessary to further define the functions and associated
functional failures for the system. Functional failures are quantified by determining what is
too much, too little or degraded functional outputs for the system. In the Navy there is an
operational aspect to this process in that functional failure often presents itself as a loss o f
mission area, which m ust be reported via the Casualty Reporting (CASREP) system.
Functional failures can often be thought o f as leading to C3 or C4 CASREP level failures.

Once all function definitions are determined, each is given a sequential number and added to
a matrix. The number assigned will be used for tracking purposes throughout the rest o f the
study. The product o f this step o f the process is the completion o f a list or matrix o f system
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function and functional failure definitions. Table 5 provides a list o f the low and medium
pressure air plant system functions and their respective system functional failures.
matrix is critical to developing the theoretical system failure modes.

System Functional
D escription

System Functional Failure Definitions
1A N o Pressure. N o C anadtri

1. Air Compression

IB Low Pressure13. Low C am d tri
1C Pressure Satisfactory. Low Canadtv*
2A N o cooling

2. Cooling

2B Inadeauate cooling
2C Excessive cooling
3A N o lubrication

3. Lubrication

3B Inadequate lubrication
4A N o flow (Ait or Fluids'!
4. Direct Flow
(Air or Fluids)

4B Incorrect flow fAir or fluids flow to incorrect location!
4C Restricted flow
5A Casualty exists, no shutdown

5. System Self Protection

5B Casualty does n o t exist, shutdown occurs
5C Casualty exists, shutdown too slow

6. Sensing

6A N o sensing
6B Incorrect sensing

7. System Integrity

7A N o containment (ruDturel
7B Partial containment (leak!

8. Water Removal
Notes:
a.
b.

8A Moisture content too high

A functional failure for ‘lo w capacity” is 25% below rated value.
A functional failure for “low pressure” is defined as a condition where the output pressure cannot reach the compressor
unloading pressure with a light load condition.

Table 5, LP-MPAC Functional Failure Matrix, Adapted from
COMNAVSURI A N T LP-MP Report, 2001.
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Failure M ode D eterm ination
This step o f the process is an analysis o f the failure modes and maintenance strategy
associated with the predominant failing com ponent o f the system. It was conducted by the
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) Analyst, and involves a detailed theoretical and
scientific engineering look at each o f the failures defined previously, with a goal o f narrowing
the field down to the m ost predominant failing component(s) and associated predominant
failure mode(s) o f the system. This is accomplished through a process o f theoretical
analysis, followed by comparison and grouping o f actual maintenance data.

Determine Theoretical Failure M odes
The first step is designed to determine a list o f the theoretical failure modes for each system
com ponent associated with each functional failure o f the system as determined previously.
These failure modes are generated from the system technical manuals, NSTM (Naval Ships
Technical Manual) chapters, system specifications, and subject m atter expert interviews.
Using the Functional Failure Matrix, Table 5, a list o f theoretical failure modes was
generated and provided in Table 6. T he table lists each Functional Failure and the most
probable theoretical failure modes that would affect the functionality o f the low and medium
pressure air plants. Each o f the theoretical failure modes is assigned a unique Failure Mode
Code (FMC) for accounting purposes.
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Table 6, Theoretical Failure Modes.

System Functional
Failure D efinition

Theoretical Failure M odes
R ecip ro catin g /R o tary H elical Screw
1A1 M otor failure
1A2 Shutdown switch failed in shutdown position
1A3 M otor controller failure

1A

N o Pressure, N o Capacity

Reciprocating Only
1A4 Drive Belt(s) broken
1A5 Pulley failure
1A6 Piston failure
1A7 Piston ring melted / seized
1A8 Piston cracked
1A9 Connecting rod bent
1A10 Connection rod bearing failure
1A11 Crankshaft bent, broken / cracked
Rotary H elical Screw Only
1A12 Rotor set seized
1A13 Rotor bearing failure
1A14 Rotor timing gears failure (RHS-N only)
1A15 Unloading system fails
1A16 Coupling failure
1A17 Injection cooling/sealing water (low Pressure)
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Table 6, Theoretical Failure Modes.

System Functional
Failure D efinition

Theoretical Failure Modes
R eciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
1B1 Unloader valve partially open
1B2 Relief valve (activating too low a pressure)
1B3 Relief valve (failed open)
1B4 Drain valves partially open
1B5 Air filter/ silencer restricted
1B6 Piping or gaskets Leaks

IB

Low Pressure, Low Capacity

Reciprocating Only
1B7 Piston rings worn or broken
1B8 Blown head gasket
1B9 Piston cylinder liner w orn
1B10 Suction / discharge valves leaking
1B11 Loose/ slipping drive belts
1B12 Piston air rod packing worn
Rotary H elical Screw O nly
1B13 Rotor set worn
IB 14 Blown casing gasket
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
1C1 Piping or gaskets Leaks
1C2 Drain valves open or partially open
1C3 Outlet check valve (opening restricted)

1C

Pressure Satisfactory, Low Capacity

Reciprocating Only
1C4 Suction / discharge valves leaking
1C5 Piston rings worn
1C6 Cylinder unloader fails in open position
Rotary H elical Screw Only
1C7 Rotor set w orn
1C8 Unloader valve partially opened
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Table 6, Theoretical Failure Modes.

System Functional
Failure Definition

2A N o cooling

Theoretical Failure M odes
R ecip ro catin g /R o tary H elical Screw
2A1 Air line restriction
2A2 FW heat exchanger (SW side) blocked (All except
RCP-M)
2A3 FW heat exchanger (F /W side) blocked (All except
RCP-M)
2A4 N o fresh water coolant (All except RCP-M)
2A5 Lube oil pump failure (All except RHS-S)
Reciprocating Only
2A6 Thermostatic valve failure
2A7 Fresh water pump failure
2A8 Clogged oil strainer
Rotaty H elical Screw Only
2A9 Fresh water injection cooling water system failure
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
2B1 FW heat exchanger restricted or air bound (S/W
side)
2B2 FW heat exchanger restricted or air bound (F/W
side)
2B3 Oil pump worn (All except RHS-S)
2B4Low fresh water coolant level (All except RCP-M)

2B Inadequate cooling

2C Excessive cooling

Reciprocating Only
2B5 Fresh water pump worn (All except RCP-M)
2B6 Intercoolers / Aftercoolers (S/W side restricted)
2B7 Thermostatic control valve malfunctioning
Rotary H elical Screw Only
2B8 Fresh water injection cooling/sealing water system
failure (low pressure/flow)
2B9 Separator holding tank leak (Low pressure)
2B10 Oil flow restricted (RHS-N only)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
2C1 Excessive seawater cooling water flow
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Table 6, Theoretical Failure Modes.

System F u n ctio n al
Failure Definition

Theoretical Failure M odes
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
3A1 Lube oil pump failure (All except RHS-S)
3A2 N o oil level (All except RHS-S)

3A N o lubrication

Reciprocating Only
3A3 Clogged oil strainer
Rotary H elical Screw Only
3A4 Oil cooler (oil side) blocked (RHS-N only)
3A5 N o Fresh water injection (RHS-S only)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
3B1 Low oil level (All except RHS-S)
3B2 Oil pump worn (All except RHS-S)
3B3 Oil filter clogged (All except RHS-S)

3B Inadequate lubrication

4A N o flow (Air or fluids)

4B Incorrect flow (Air o f fluids flow to
incorrect location)

4C Restricted flow

Reciprocating Only
3B4 Clogged oil strainer
Rotary H elical Screw Only
3B5 Oil cooler (oil side) restricted (RHS-N only)
3B6 Clogged oil nozzles (RHS-N only)
3B7 Low fresh water injection pressure (RHS-S only)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
4A1 Improper valve position (shut)
4A2 Valve failure (failed shut)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
4B1 Improper valve position (shut/open)
4B2 Valve failure (leakage)
4B3 Valve failure (failed shut)
4B4 Valve failure (failed open)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
4C1 Valve in mid-position
4C2 Clogged strainer
4C3 Cooling system restricted (S/W side)
4C4 Cooling system (FW side) restricted (Except RCPM)
4C5 Air filter/silencer restricted
Rotary H elical Screw only
4C6 Injection water filter restricted
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Table 6, Theoretical Failure Modes.

System Functional
Failure D efinition
5A Casualty exists, no shutdown
5B

Casualty does n o t exist, shutdown
occurs

5C

Casualty exists, shutdown
too slow

T heoretical Failure M odes
R ecip ro catin g /R o tary H elical Screw
5A1 Trips do not activate (Refer to Table 5-2)
5A2 Relief valve (activating pressure too high)
R ecip ro catin g /R o tary H elical Screw
5B1 Trips activate without failure condition present
(refer to Table 5-2)
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
5C1 Sensing lines fouled
Reciprocating Only
5C2 Oil pressure sensing timer failure
Rotary H elical Screw Only
5C3 Injection water / oil pressure timer failure

6A N o sensing

6B Incorrect sensing

7A N o containment (rupture)

Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
6A1 Pressure sensing - Sensing line is pinched, clogged,
kinked, cut or sensing valve closed
6A2 Temperature sensing —Sensor is fouled or cut
6A3 Level sensing —Mechanical linkage binding, contacts
6A4 Sensor opened or shorted (electrically)
6A5 Wiring harness cut/shorted
R eciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
6B1 Pressure sensing —Sensing line is pinched, clogged
or kinked
6B2 Temperature sensing —Sensor is fouled
6B3 Level sensing —Mechanical linkage binding, contacts
6B4 Sensor out o f calibration
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
7A1 Head / casing gaskets seals blown
7A2 Head / casing cracked
7A3 H oses/Piping ruptured
Reciprocating Only
7A4 Interstage cooler rupture
Rotary H elical Screw Only
7A5 Rupture disk ruptured (RHS-S only)
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Table 6, Theoretical Failure Modes.

System F unctional
Failure Definition

T h eo retical F a ilu re M odes
Reciprocating/Rotary H elical Screw
7B1 Head / casing gaskets / seals leak
7B2 Gaskets/seals leak
7B3 H oses/piping cracked, deteriorated or mechanical
joint failure

7B Partial containment (leak)
Reciprocating Only
7B4 Interstage cooler leak
Rotary H elical Screw Only
7B5 Oil / Water seal failure (RHS-N only)
Reciprocating only
8A1 Condensate/water level too high in separator
8A2 Condensate drain failure
8A Moisture content too high

Rotary H elical Screw only
8A3 Water level too high in separator holding tank
8A4 Chiller/dehydrator dew point temperature too
high1

Note:
1 - Depending on die air plant configuration, a “too high” dew point temperature is defined as greater than 50 or 65 degrees.

A pplication o f E x p ert FMEA
Based on the literature, it was determined that a panel o f experts would be necessary to
develop a holistic perspective on the behavior o f the system. The approach to the elicitation o f
the experts’ judgment would be a Delphi Methodology, capturing the underlying theme o f the
literature on expert elicitation as supported by Baecher (2002). Structure for the process is
provided through the use o f FMEA worksheet provided to the experts. The approach to the
elicitation is as follows:
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1. Develop a FMEA worksheet based on the theoretical failure modes. The worksheet
allows the expert to assert his opinion on the three components o f the RPN has
detailed in the conceptual model based on a nominal scale.
2. Select the panel o f experts displaying a broad spectrum o f expertise on the LP-MPAC
system.
3. Discuss the theoretical failure modes with the experts to determine the applicability for
use in the effort Take inputs from the experts as to specific line codes for removal
from the study and where additional codes must be included.
4. Provide training to the experts on how to best approach the quantification o f their
beliefs on the FMEA worksheet. An example is provided for discussion, and questions
regarding the scales, provided to guide their opinions, are addressed.
5. The experts are then asked to record their opinions over the next week individually on
the work sheet provided.
6. The expert worksheets are collected. The mean numeric value o f the expert response
to each failure mode is then recorded on a worksheet and provided to the group o f
experts.
7. The experts are asked to compare the mean response to each failure mode RPN
component to their individual response. Discussion among the experts is now
encouraged and is guided through the facilitator until a consensus is reached on the
each response. The consensus is recorded as a discrete value.
8. The documented consensus is then distributed to each o f the experts for final review.
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F M EA W orksheet
The FMEA worksheet was developed based on the System Functional Failure Definitions and
the Theoretical Failure Modes developed by the COMNAVSURFLANT effort. A portion o f
the FMEA worksheet is presented (Figure 13) as an example o f the basic layout o f the
worksheet developed for use.

F unction

Im p a c t o f
Failure

P robability of
O ccurrence

P robability of
Repair
RPN

R epair

O ccurrence

Severity

P otential
cause of
failure

F ailure
M ode

1A1
M otor
failure

Air Compressic

a

lr
*o
OS
1A2

u
0

Shutdown
switch
failed
in
shutdow n
position

Z

if

9CO

1CO)

VI

Ph

0

1A3
Motor
controller
failure

z

Figure 13, FMEA Worksheet Example

Selection o f Experts
Experts were requested from, and provided by, the office o f the Commander Naval Surface
Fleet Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT). Experts provided were selected from FTSCLANT
(Fleet Technical Support Center Atlantic), AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP (Supervisor o f Ships)
Portsmouth, and COM NAV SURFLANT for participation in the process. While the experts
supplied from the differing organizations had some technical expertise in the LP-MPAC
system, the FTSCLANT representatives were the absolute technical experts on the LP-MPAC
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system itself. FTSCLANT representatives are certified to assess the system and provide
technical support to the fleet. The remaining members o f the expert panel were not as
knowledgeable in the technical areas o f the system, their expertise in the maintenance
capabilities o f the system operators and the area o f mission effect is recognized as necessary to
provide breadth to the consensus model.

Each member o f the panel was asked to complete a qualifying questionnaire. The
questionnaire is supplied in Appendix B, and was used to capture data such as educational
training, experience with the system, mission requirements and familiarity with existing
maintenance personnel training to document the expert was qualified to be a member o f the
panel.

D iscussion o f the System Failure D efinition and T heo retical Failure M odes and
Expert Training on Scoring the FM EA Categories
Experts on the panel reviewed the theoretical failure modes. Modifications were made to
arrive at an agreement on the cause o f specific failure modes and the worksheet was revised
accordingly. Additionally the experts were given direction on how to complete the FMEA
worksheet Appendix A is an example FMEA worksheet and a group o f Tables that provide
guidance to the arrival at a nominal scale score to be used when filling out the FMEA
worksheet This information was presented to the expert panel and reviewed to ensure that all
experts were in agreement on the scales used to score their opinions.

C om pilation o f Expert O pinion
Expert FMEA work sheets were collected and compiled. The average scores for each RPN
factor was then calculated and provided to the experts. After a lengthy discussion, a consensus

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78
was reached and recorded. The FMEA worksheet was then presented to the experts for final
review.

Research M ethodology Summary
A reductonistic systems model was developed. From that model, and through expert elicitation
via a modified FMEA, expert model a holistic perspective o f system behavior was modeled
through the production o f RPNs based on the tightly held knowledge o f the experts. The
results were then compared to an RPN comparative o f historical data and existing
maintenance procedural guidelines to test the model developed. The analysis o f data and the
interpretation o f the results will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER

V

RESULTS O F R ESEARCH

Intro d u ctio n
This chapter discusses the assimilation o f a panel o f experts and compares the consensus o f
the expert panel in the development o f RPNs to the historical RPN comparative. The expert
RPN and historical RPN are graphically compared. Additionally nonparametric statistics are
used to make inferences about the two RPN types (expert and historical).

Observations o f

each test of the four Platforms: A, B, C, and D are made and presented in this chapter along
with test of the three factors comprising the RPN. Finally regression analysis is used to
determine subsets exerting the greatest influence in the resultant RPN.

Assimilation o f Expert Panel
As stated in the previous chapter, a panel o f experts was convened. Experts were selected
from FTSCLANT, AMSEC LLC, SUPSHIP Portsmouth, and COMNAVSURFLANT for
participation in the process. While the experts supplied from the differing organizations had
some technical expertise in the LP-MPAC system, the FTSCLANT representatives were the
absolute technical experts on the LP-MPAC system itself. FTSCLANT representatives are
certified by COM NAV SURFLANT to assess the system and provide technical support to the
fleet. The remaining members o f the expert panel were knowledgeable in the technical areas of
the system, and held expertise in the maintenance capabilities o f the system operators and the
area o f mission effect is recognized as necessary to provide breadth to the consensus model.
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Each member o f the panel was asked to complete a qualifying questionnaire. The
questionnaire is suppEed in Appendix B, and was used to capture data such as educational
training, experience with the system, mission requirements and familiarity with existing
maintenance personnel training to document the expert was quahfied to be a member o f the
panel. The rejection threshold for this effort was less than 5 years experience in the area o f
expertise assigned. This was confirmed by COMNAVSURFLANT for the experts provided;
no

experts

were

rejected

based

on

this

criteria

from

those

provided

by

COMNAVSURFLANT.

Expert

Education and Training

Group Affiliation

Area of Expertise

FTSCLANT

Maintenance and Repair of
LPAC/MPAC Systems

SUPSHIP

Maintenance Policy

SUPSHIP

C

High School
20+ yrs experience with LPAC/MPAC System
BSME
MS
BSME

D

BSME

COMNAVSURFLANT

E

BSME
BSME
BS (Mathematics)
42+ years Shipbuilding Design and Repair
20+year Experience
OEM Training on LPAC/MPAC Platforms
BSMET
BSEM, MEM
10+ Years Experience LPAC/MPAC
Maintenance and Repair

SUPSHIP

Maintenance Policy
Process Engineering.
Maintenance Strategy
General Engineering

AMSEC

Assessment Analyst

FTSCLANT

Maintenance and Repair of
LPAC/MPAC Systems

FTSCLANT

Supervisor of LPAC/MPAC
Maintenance Atlantic Fleet

A
B

F
G
H

Table 7, Expert demographics.

Experts on the panel reviewed the theoretical failure modes. Modifications were made to
arrive at an agreement on the cause o f specific failure modes and the worksheet was revised
accordingly. Additionally the experts were given direction on how to complete the FMEA
w orksheet Appendix A is an example FMEA worksheet and a group of tables that provide
guidance to the arrival at a nominal scale score to be used when filling out the FMEA
worksheet This information was presented to the expert panel and reviewed to ensure that all
experts were in agreement on the scales used to score their opinions.
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Results
Data was compiled and reviewed. The study addressed 113 different ships. Among the 113
ships there were 305 air compressors distributed among the LP-MPAC systems. Two distinct
configuration types were observed in the LP-MPAC systems studied based on the type of
compressor: RHS (Rotary Helical Screw) and RCP (Reciprocating). RHS type configuration
additionally decomposed into two classes: RHS-S (Rotary Helical Screw —Star) and RHS-N
(Rotary Helical Screw —NAXI). RHS compressors were used only on LPAC systems. RCP
compressors were used on both LPAC and MPAC systems.

Additionally the systems

understudy were grouped according to the number o f air compressors the system contained.
To test the model only reciprocating compressors were used, as they were o f consistent class
and type. These were then grouped into the four platforms for comparison based on system
similarity.

Comparison o f R PN E to R P N H
Based on system configuration, between 77 and 87 distinct failure modes were addressed in
each platform. Once the RPNs were compiled from the experts FMEA, the data (in the form
o f the Expert RPN) was weighed against the Historical RPN comparative developed for the
test o f the hypothesis presented in the previous chapter as Hypothesis 1. Initially data was
graphed to visualize the differences in the Expert RPN and the Historical RPN comparative.
An example o f the graphical representation is shown in figures 14-17.
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Figure 14, Comparison of RPN E and RPN H, Platform
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Figure 15, Comparison of RPN E and RPN H, Platform
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While a graphical approach showed that the Expert RPN trended as expected, further
statistical tests were deemed necessary. A Wilcoxon sign rank sum test for matched pairs was
used to evaluate the data. The selection o f use for the non-parametric statistical analysis was
based on the non-normality of the expert responses. SPSS was used to perform the analysis.
Summary Table Nonparametric S tatistica l T est
RPNHiST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP
Platform A
RRftHST > RPNEXP
RPNHST * RPNEXP
60°/<f
TOTAL

RPNHIST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP
Platform 8
71*4

RPNHIST > RPNEXP
RPNHIST* RPNEXP
TOTAL

RPNHIST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP
Platform C
RPNHIST > RPNEXP

74*4

RPNHiST* RPNEXP
TOTAL

RPNHIST - RPNEXP RPNHIST < RPNEXP
Platform 0

82°/<j

RPNHIST > RPNEXP
RPNHIST* RPNEXP
TOTAL

52 Test Statistics
35

0

Wilcoxon
Sign

87
59 Test Statistics

Wilcoxon

25
3

Sign

87
55 Test Statistics
22
6

Wilcoxon
Sign

82

58 Test Statistics

Wilcoxon

14

5
77

Sign

Z
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed)
Z
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed)

-2.820

Z
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed)
Z
Asymp. Sig (24ailed)

-4.933

Z
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed)
Z
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed)

-4.362

Z
Asymp. Sig (24ailed)
Z
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed)

-5.456
0.000
-5.068
0.000

0.023

-1.715
0.086

0.000
-3.601
0.000

0.000
■3.785

0.000

Table 8, Summary o f Nonparametric Statistical Test, Platforms A-D.

Observations
It is noted that the Expert RPN was equal too or exceeded the Historical RPN comparative
60% o f the time in Platform A, 71% o f the time in Platform B, 74% o f the time in Platform C,
and 82% of the time in Platform D. While the percentages are not very high, the significance
o f the differences do indicate that the R PN E is greater than or equal to the R PN H on both the
Wilcoxon and Sign tests. Consequently the analysis supports hypothesis 1 made in the
research. However, further review o f the data was deemed necessary to explain the lack o f the
expert RPN exceeding the Historical RPN by a larger percentage.
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Comparison o f Factors in R P N M odel
Initially, the each component o f the Expert R PN was compared to the corresponding
comparative Historical RPN com ponent to test hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. The comparisons for
each platform are presented graphically for comparison in figures 18 through 29.
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Figure 28, Comparison

of Repair E and Repair H, Platform
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Figure 29, Comparison

CO
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of Repair E and Repair H, Platform
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Observations o f Results
It was initially apparent that while two components (severity and reparability) (example figures
18-21 and 26-29, respectively) tend to trend comparably with the historical data values in the
four platforms, the experts were inconsistent with the historical data on the occurrence o f the
failures (figures 22-25).

Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 were tested to determine if a factor or factors exist that contribute to
resulting RPN in a greater proportion. The graphical comparisons o f the expert versus the
historical comparative are presented in figures 30-41.
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Figure 30, Severity x Occurrence - Platform
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Figure 31, Severity x Repair - Platform
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Figure 33, Severity x O ccurrence —Platform
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Tw o Factor Observations
It was observed that two o f the three components in the model exerted greater influence over
the resultant outcome o f the model (occurrence and reparability). A Dot-Matrix plot o f the
two factors Figure 42 show how the data points for the combination o f the two variables
produces a more identifiable relationship to the resultant RPN in the historical model. While
not as defined in the expert model it is still visibly apparent as figure 43 shows.

SxO H

SxR H

RxO H

F ig u ie 42, D o t m atrix p lo t o f tw o -fa c to r p r o d u c t c o m p a re d to th reefa c to r R P N M o d el u sin g H isto ric a l D ata.
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Figure 43, D ot matrix plot o f two-factor product compared to threefactor RPN Model using Expert Data.

The overall system configuration supports this correlation as redundancy inherent in the
system is used to minimize the severity o f component failure impacting the ability o f the
system to support the mission o f the metasystem.

By performing a best subsets regression o f the factors yields the following concurrence to the
graphical display o f the dot-matrix plot o f the data.
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MINITAB OUTPUT FROM APPENDIX D
Best Subsets Regression: RPNH versus SevH, QccrH, RepH
Response is RPNH

0

Vars

R-Sq

R-Sq(adj)

C-p

S

1
1
*2
2
3

64.2
21.8
79.3
67 .3
85 .2

63.8
20.9
78.8
66 .5
84 .7

117 .9
355.7
35.1
102.6
4 .0

14.054
20.767
10.748
13.515
9.1409

S
e
v
H

c
c
r
H

R
e
p
H
X

X
X X
X
X
X X X

Best Subsets Regression: RPNE versus SevE, OccrE, RepE
Response is RPNE

0

Vars

R-Sq

R-Sq(adj)

C-p

S

1
1
*2
2
3

54 .5
34 .3
80.7
63 .8
89.7

53 .9
33.5
80.2
62 .9
89.3

282.7
444 .9
74 .0
209 .9
4.0

16 .349
19.641
10.707
14.667
7.8817

S
e
v
E

c
c
r
E

R
e
p
E
X

X
X X
X
X
X X X

This was confirmed through a regression analysis and the resulting Pearson product moment
coefficient o f correlation (r) and the resulting coefficient o f determination

(r2).
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Regression Analysis: RPNH versus RxO H
The regression equation is
RPNH = - 5.03 + 3.33 RxO H
Predictor
Constant
RxO H

Coef
-5 .0337
3. 33065

S = 5.722
PRESS = 3036.19

SE Coef
0 .9400
0.09073

T
-5.35
36 .71

R-Sq = 94.1%
R-Sq(pred) = 93 .53%

P
0.000
0 .000
R- Sq(adj)

= 94.0%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Lack of Fit
Pure Error
Total

DF
1
85
14
71
86

SS
44118
2783
1607
1176
46901

MS
44118
33
115
17

F
1347 .65

P
0.000

6 .93

0.000

Regression Analysis: RPNE versus RxO E
The regression equation is
RPNE = - 4.30 + 3.68 RxO E
Predictor
Constant
RxO E

Coef
4 .295
3 .6773

S = 7.884
PRESS = 5596.52

SE Coef
1.673
0.1372

P
0 .012
0.000

T
-2.57
26.79

R-Sq = 89.4%
R-Sq(pred) = 88.79%

R-Sq(adj)

= 89.3%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Lack of Fit
Pure Error
Total

DF
1
85
14
71
86

SS
44620
5283
1352
3931
49902

MS
44620
62
97
55

F
717.91

P
0.000

1. 74

0.066

Observations o f Results
In comparing the two regression equations, it is noted that the slopes o f the lines are different
with the slope o f the expert line being slightly steeper.
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Chapter Summary
It is im portant to note that the expert R PN trended similarly to the historical RPN. This
provides support for the acceptance o f the expert’s ability to forecast the systems behavior
similarly to the use o f the historical data. Comparison o f the data graphically and through the
use o f both parametric and nonparametric statistical methods showed that the experts were
similar in the trend o f scoring the RPN variables with a tendency to score the severity and
reparability variables higher than the variables equivalent developed from the historical data.
This yielded higher RPNs. The experts were not as consistent with the occurrence factor in
RPN model.

Through regression analysis and graphical comparison, it was also discovered that for the
platforms understudy, occurrence and reparability were predominate factors in determining the
RPN in the expert model, the historical comparative, and across all four platforms
investigated.
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CHAPTER

VI

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Introduction
In the initial observation o f the RPN components, it was also noted that there was little
consistency or trend correlation to the occurrence factor between the experts and the historical
data (Figure 44). This chapter will attempt to explain observed variations in the model and
propose alternate theories for investigation.

F igure

4 4 , C o m p a riso n O c c u rre n c e E a n d O c c u rre n c e H —P la tfo rm A.

Development of RPN-Adjusted
In looking at the difference between the expert and historical, the concept o f complementarity
\

as it applies to complex systems seems to be in evidence. "Any
\

two different perspectives (or models) about a system will reveal
truths about that system that are neither entirely independent nor
entirely compatible" (Clemson, 1984). A better explanation was

F igure 45, T h e P aradoxical C ube.
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developed by W olf (1989) in his attempt to describe the paradoxical cube:

A t firstyou may see the tipper most square in front, as if you were looking up at the cube. But if you
take a second glance, you may find thatyou are suddenly looking down at the cube, and the bottom
most square appears to pop out closest to you. A s the observer, you have the choice of howyou will
observe the cube. It isyour act of observation that resolves the paradox. In its abstractform, both the
upper and lower squares of the illustration are, so to speak, in front at the same time or in the rear at
the same time. But in viewing the illustration as a cube, you the observer create the experience of this
tow dimensionalform having rear and front faces. Your act of observing creates the picture in your
mind that it is a cube. It is only a paradoxical cube when we, observers conditioned to think that
everything we see must be solid, insist that “it” is a solid cube. Then the cube appears tojumpfrom one
perspective to another, seeminglyplaying tricks on us.

The experts are preconditioned due to recent experiences with the systems under study that
their perspective is shifted to the more recent occurrences. Checkland (1999) refers to this
phenomenon as the viewpoint o f the observer. The experts due to their proximity to the
system are unable to look past the recent time frame to yield an accurate opinion o f the 5-year
period o f actual occurrence.

As occurrence is a predominate factor in computing the RPN, as previously shown, an
adjusted RPN (RPNadj) was developed using the historical occurrence data, and the expert
severity and reparability data and then compared to the RPNH. This was necessitated to
compensate for the narrow view o f the experts on the occurrence component o f the model.
The resultant graphs are shown as figures 46-49.
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Best Subsets Regression: RPNadj versus SevE, RepE, OccrH
Response is RPNadj

0
SRc
Vars

R-Sq

R-Sq(adj)

C-p

S

1
1
*2
2
3

52.2
36.1
87.5
55.6
89.0

51.7
35.3
87.2
54.6
88.6

278 .3
400 .6
13 .5
254 .8
4.0

19.011
21.994
9.7799
18.437
9.2208

e e c
v p r
E E H
X
X
X X
X X
X X X

Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is
RPNadj = - 0.750 + 3 .36 RXO-A
Predictor
Constant
RXO-A

Coef
-0 .7505
3 .36161

S = 7.016
PRESS = 17676.9

SE Coef
0.6143
0.04775

T
-1.22
70 .40

R-Sq = 93.4%
R-Sq(pred) = 93.23%

P
0.223
0.000
R-Sq(adj)

■

.4%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Lack of Fit
Pure Error
Total

DF
1
352
13
339
353

SS
243947
17325
6063
11262
261272

MS
243947
49
466
33

F
4956.33

3.000

14.04

3.000

P
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Sum m ary
Comparison o f the RPN H to the RPNadj yielded an improved test o f the initial hypothesis
where in that the adjusted RPN scores were equal to or exceeded the historical RPN 68% o f
the time in Platform A, 85% o f the time in Platform B, 76% o f the time in Platform C, and
83% o f the time in Platform D. in 82% o f the cases modeled. SPSS outputs for testing
RPNadj and R PN H are located in Appendix C and are summarized here in Table 9.
"Summary Table Nonparametric Statistical Test
RPNHIS 7 < RPNadj
RPNHIST > RPNadj
68% RPNHIST = RPNadj
TOTAL

57
28

RPNHIST < RPNadj
RPNHIST > RPNadj
RPNHIST = RPNadj
TOTAL

62
13
12
87

RPNHIST - RPNadj RPNHIST < RPNadj
RPNHIST > RPNadj
Platform C
(74%)
76% RPNHIST = RPNadj
2% increase
TOTAL

57
20
5
82

RPNHIST < RPNadj
RPNHIST > RPNadj
83% RPNHIST = RPNadj
TOTAL

62

RPNHIST - RPNadj
Platform

A

(60%)
8% in c rea se

RPNHIST - RPNadj
Platform B
(71%)
85%
14% in c re a se

RPNHIST - RPNadj
Platform D

(82%)
1% in c rea se

2
87

13
2
77

T ab le 9, S u m m ary o f N o n p a ra m e tric Statistical T e st, R P N a d j P la tfo rm s A -D .

For consistency, a best subset regression was preformed on the adjusted model showed the
relationship o f reparability and occurrence held as the dominating factors in the three-factor
RPN model and is included in Appendix D.

The use of the adjusted RPN showed a marked similarity in shape to that o f the historical
RPN over that o f the

o r ig in a l

expert RPN. While the increases in the nonparametric statistical
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test were minimal for Platforms C and D , visual comparison o f the graphs show greater trend
similarity with the historical RPN and the adjusted RPN than with the expert RPN.
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CHAPTER

VI I

R ESEAR C H C O N C L U SIO N S

Intro d u ctio n
This chapter discusses the conclusions drawn from the research. Recommendations for further
research on complex systems using high-level FMEA, as a basis for development o f a holistic
perspective on the behavior, are also discussed.

Conclusions
This research tested hypotheses focusing on the ability o f experts to develop risk priority
numbers consistent with the historical data on a legacy system. The results o f the research
extend the scholarly literature by developing a new use for FMEA, commonly used in research
and design, and expanding it as a tool that allows for a targeted assessment o f system
components when compared to historical failure and repair data. Use o f the expert provides
for a more holistic approach to modeling o f the system under study than that o f historical data,
as the experts may have greater insight into the ability o f the current personnel to repair and
maintain the equipment.

The initial research question posed in the dissertation was, “can a methodology that uses the
expert knowledge, elicited from system experts through a high level FMEA, be used to create a
knowledge based decision support system to aid in the assessment o f legacy systems?”

Consistent trending o f the expert RPN and the proposed adjusted RPN indicate that the
expert behavioral model is consistent with the historical behavior o f the systems under study.
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It can also be noted that the expert tended to evaluate the factors o f repair and severity at
higher levels than the historical data indicated. This could indicate that the expert has a more
holistic view of the system as it relates to the much larger system and group of systems that
comprise the ship thus more accurately reflecting the effects o f the system under study on the
ships mission availability.

Conversely, the experts due to their proximity to the system are unable to look past the recent
time frame to yield an accurate opinion o f the 5-year period o f actual occurrence. As discussed
in the previous chapter, it became apparent to the researcher that the experts lacked the
capacity to recall the failures occurring over a 5-year period.

With the concept of

complementary, it became insightful that the perspective o f the expert was clouded by recent
events that could be easily recalled. As the historical data used to provide the actual failures
for the past five years was readily available, the RPN adjusted was developed and presented as
a means to overcome this obstacle in future research.

As expected the experts resultant RPN, and the RPN adjusted, was greater than or equal to the
RPN developed from historical data relating to the actual system behavior in the majority of
the failures investigated. This indicates a propensity, as stated in the first hypothesis, that the
experts will be more holistic in their assignment o f the variables. O ther conclusions from
analysis o f the data are as follows:

1. System design has influence over the outcome o f the RPN.

In the system studied for this research, initial design o f the system provided redundant
components that mitigated the severity o f the component failure in regards to system
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behavior and response to com ponent failure. As a result o f this design, severity o f
component failure exerted less influence than the other variables in the model. Design
for ease o f repair and robust system designs would intuitively yield reductions in the
resultant RPN as well.

2. Reparability o f the system is a function o f the complex interaction o f the personnel
with the system and has a tendency to exert influence over the outcome o f the RPN
model.

Analysis o f the historical data regarding repair and the expert’s opinion were, while
similar, often differing.

The experts tended to score reparability o f the system at

higher levels due to their belief that the personnel lacked the necessary skills required
in the performance o f the tasks necessary to repair the system. It is the expert’s
evaluation o f the personnel ability that gives depth and perspective (a more holistic
view) to the model that cannot be captured from the historical data

3. The characteristics o f complex systems, i.e. complementarity, self-organization and
system darkness, have a profound effect on the ability to model system behavior.

The experts are human beings that have had a great deal o f interaction with the system;
as such, it is their experience with the system under study that a holistic perspective is
trying to incorporate. The complex system and any representation o f the complex
system can only be described by what is known, observed or suspected. Unknown,
unobserved, unrepresentative, and emergent characteristics will be present System
behavior and informal structure emerge only through system operation, regardless o f
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the detailed design efforts conducted prior to system deployment In the legacy system
it is even more apparent because the system has been deployed for a great length of
time. In order to capture these aspects and quantify them for use in development o f
management decisions, it is paramount to cast a wide net through the use o f experts
on the system to gamer the vantage point or frame o f reference when viewing the
system that reveals the m ost knowledge about the system in it current operational
state.

Recommendations
Maintenance productivity is a critical element o f Engineering Management and Systems
Engineering. A significant issue in developing and implementing productive maintenance
systems involves development and analysis o f data that can direct changes and identify high
priority areas.

This research supports a systemic approach to predictive maintenance

programs. This approach employs a modified form o f Failure Mode Effects Analysis with a
Risk Priority System ranking system that employs expert judgment. While this fills a critical
gap in the literature, it leads to the following recommendations for future research in this area:

1. Similar research should be done on a variety o f systems to map the resulting Expert
RPN against the Historical data.

While the research looked at single system on

multiple platforms, it is believed that based on initial system design, variables in the
RPN model may have changing predominance in the outcome o f the resultant RPN.

2. While current FMEA looks at three factors in development o f the RPN, it is suggested
that this or a similar study look at the addition o f a fourth variable —cost While it may
be construed as a factor looked upon in modeling severity and reparability, using cost
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as an additional factor may have benefit in looking at the system model in a more
holistic manner.

3. Use o f different means to elicit the expert opinion (other than the Delphi method used
in this research) might result in differing results to the expert model. Testing the
elicitation techniques against each other may provide greater insight into the best way
to extract the knowledge held by the experts in this field.

4. Using the historical model as a test basis, disparity in the two models may be used to
target resources for improvement in the system. This would allow for the targeted
deployment o f resources and time when dealing with a legacy system that is cosdy to
assess.

Failure Mode Effects Analysis is a useful tool in research and design, by adapting the model
slightly it appears to be even more useful in evaluation o f legacy systems.

Prediction of

problems before they occur can minimize system downtime and lead to targeted proactive
maintenance planning. The methodology offered in the research provides a framework for the
use o f experts to provide engineering managers a m ore holistic perspective o f a legacy system
when making maintenance assessments.
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Figure A-1: Example of Fault Tree System Diagram
Note: Fault tree may begin with components as shown here and may evolve to functional breakdown.
compressor in the left column may contain “oil system" and include the pump and cooler.
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Table A -l: FMEA W orksheet Example
EauiDment Descriotio n: Comoressor

T od level: Refriaeration svstem

Sub component: Piston and connectina rod

SE!MA‘F II date:

Ship:
FM EA Number:

Date:

Prepared bv:

Revrision:

Paae

of
SEM A T II Results

Function

Piston
connecting
rod System
failure

Failure
Mode

Cracked rod
or arm

Potential
cause of
failure

Impact of
Failure

Metal failure

6

System
down
overhaul needed

1

Oil
failure

pump

6

System
down
overhaul needed

5

oil

6

Clogged
filter.
Ring failure

o
0
e
1
3
§

w
1
>1

Oil
failure

5

Probability of
Repair

Probability of
Occurrence

i

•5*

Recommende
d SEMATII
action

SEMAT II
action taken

I I
I
c

i

Extremely
infrequentno
indication
of
problems in 3-M
or ICAS for this
compressor
Pump and switch
must both be bad
for failure.

8

Cannot
be
repaired
by
ship's crew ,
significant part
issues.

48

ICAS and 3-M
do not indicate
problems. Level
1
recommended

8

Oil
pressure
switch
shuts
down
compressor occasional
failure

240

Level 2- Test
pump
and
replace
pressure switch

Flow switch must
fail to damage
compressor

8

240

Level
2
replace
sensors

all

Level 2
system

for

A
T5 C
z !

6

1

8

48

6

3

8

144

6

3

8

144

pump

Interpretation: Based on FMEA, summary recommendation may be for Level 2 maintenance since no indicators show that
extensive Level 3 maintenance is justified.
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TABLE A-2 SEVERITY RATING FOR FMEA
Consider these criteria when selecting the failure severity impact rating
CASREP potential

Effect
No effect

Rank
1

System Description
Required for overall integrity of other than essential or backup system.

Mission Impact
No effect to personnel,
ship, or mission

Very slight

2

Required for overall integrity of other than essential or backup system.

Minimal possibility of C-2.

Slight

3

Required for efficient performance of ship’s mission, or
Important safety or damage control item, or
Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are not essential, but are required
as backups in case of primary system failure.

Very slight effect to
personnel,
ship,
or
mission
Slight effect to personnel,
ship, or mission

Minor

4

Required for efficient performance of ship’s mission, or
Important safety or damage control item, or
Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are not essential, but are required
as backups in case of primary system failure.

Minor effect to personnel,
ship, or mission

Normally C-2 in at least 50% of
cases

Moderate

5

Required for efficient performance of ship’s mission, or
Important safety or damage control item, or
Required for overall integrity of equipment or systems that are not essential, but are required
as backups in case of primary system failure.

Moderate
personnel,
mission,

effect
ship,

to
or

Usually C-2 in at least 75% of
cases, chance of G-3 CASREP is
10% or less

Significant

6

Required to sustain performance of ship’s mission, orExtremely important safety or damage
control item, orRequired to maintain overall integrity of ship or a system essential to ship’s
mission.

Significant
personnel,
mission,

effect
ship,

to
or

Possible C-3 in at least 25% of
cases

Major

7

Required to sustain performance of ship's mission, or
Extremely important safety or damage control item, or
Required to maintain overall integrity of ship or a system essential to ship’s mission,.

Major effect to personnel,
ship, or mission

Likely C-3 (over 50% of cases),
C-4 is possible (less than 10% of
cases)

Serious

8

Extreme
(with warning)

9

Required to sustain performance of ship’s mission, or
Extremely important safety or damage control item, or
Required to maintain overall integrity of ship or a system essential to ship’s mission.
Required for performance of ship’s mission, or Critical safety or damage control issue.

Serious
personnel,
mission,
Extreme
personnel,
mission.

Hazardous
(without warning)

10

Required for performance of ship’s mission, or
Critical safety or damage control issue.

Hazardous
personnel,
mission.

None

Possible C-2 (25% or less)

effect
ship,

to
or

Definite C-3. C-4 possible in
50% or less of cases

effect
ship,

to
or

Normally C-4 (over 50% of
cases)

to
or

Normally C-4
cases)

effect
ship,

(over 50% of
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Table A-3 FMEA Occurrence Guidelines
Rate the probability of failure occurrence over the next 12 months of operation considering the current state of the system
_________________________________ including ICAS monitoring and 3M data.________________ _________________
Detection / Sensor Criteria
Occurrence
Rank
Estimated
Probability of
Typical Occurrence
MTTF (hours)

failure in 8,500
hours (12 months)

Almost never

1

MTTF> 100,000

P (failure) - 1%

Remote

2

MTTF- 100,000

P (failure) - 5%

Very slight

3

MTTF- 75,000

P (failure) -10%,

Slight

4

MTTF - 40,000

P (failure) - 25%,

Low

5

MTTF - 25,000

P (failure) - 40%,

Medium

6

MTTF - 10,000

P (failure) - 60%,

Moderately
High
High

7

MTTF - 5,000

P (failure) - 75%,

8

MTTF - 3,000

P(failure) - 90%,

Very High

9

MTTF - 2,000

P(failure) - 95%,

Almost
Certain

10

MTTF - 1,000

P(failure) - 99%,

Description
Current controls / detectors, or maintenance
information / procedures almost always detect the
failure. Reliable detection controls are known and
used in similar processes. Audible alarm cannot be
ignored. ICAS monitors and alarms this failure so it
does not occur.
Very high likelihood current controls, detectors and /
or maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
High likelihood current controls, detectors and / or
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Moderately high likelihood current controls, detectors
and / or maintenance procedures will detect the
failure.
Medium likelihood current controls, detectors and / or
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Low likelihood current controls, detectors and / or
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Slight likelihood current controls, detectors and / or
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Very slight likelihood current controls, detectors and /
or maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
Remote likelihood current controls, detectors and / or
maintenance procedures will detect the failure.
No known controls, detection or maintenance
procedure available to detect failure

Failure is extremely unlikely,
history shows no reason for
failure prediction.

Failures very rare.
Failures occur infrequently.
Failures occur occasionally.
Failures
occur
moderate frequency
Failures
occur
regularity
System fails often.

with
with

Failures will occur in the
large majority of cases
Very high failure rate.
Failure almost certain.

Resolution: If actual numerical value falls between two values - always select the higher value. If the team has a disagreement in the ranking, use the
following approach:
• If adjacent categories, average the difference. For example, one member says 5 and one member says 6, the ranking would be 5.5. If the
disagreement is more than one category, consensus must be reached - even with one holdout. This indicates a serious difference in severity. Do not use
average or majority.
Team may not agree 100% but able to “live with it.”
Everyone must have ownership
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Table A-4 FMEA Remediation Guidelines
Rate the probability of remediating the failure based on whether it can be detected, mitigated, and / or prevented by maintenance
actions, controls, inspections, or maintenance information (ICASE). Low - ranked failure modes are not productive areas for
SEMAT II activity.
Detection

Rank
1

Probability of
Detection
P (remediation) >
99%
P (remediation) ~
95%
P (remediation) ~
90%
P (remediation) ~
75%
P (remediation) ~
60%
P (remediation) ~
40%

Almost
certain
Very High

2

High

3

Moderately
High
Medium

4

Low

6

Slight

7

P (remediation) ~
25%

Very slight

8

Remote

9

Almost
Impossible

10

P (remediation) ~
10%
P (remediation) ~
5%
P (remediation) <
1%

5

Repair context

Parts availability

Easily repairable by ship's force 99% or more

Parts readily available without delays 99%
or more
Parts readily available, delays seldom
occur very infrequently
Parts normally available, delays seldom
occur
Parts normally available with minor delays

Repairable by ship’s force in at least 95% of
cases
Normally repairable by ship’s force in at least
90% of cases
Often repairable by ship’s force in at least
75% of cases.
Usually repairable by ship’s force (in about
60% of cases) and 10% require FTA support
Occasionally repairable by ship’s force (in
10% of cases) and at least 25% requiring
FTA.
Seldom repaired by ship’s force (less than a
5%) and often requiring FTA in 50% or more
cases,
Unlikely repair by ships forces, usually FTA to
accomplish repairs in at least 75% of cases
Not repairable by ships forces, always
requires FTA to accomplish repairs
Not repairable by ships forces, always
requires FTA to accomplish repairs

Parts usually available
Parts occasionally available

Deployment Repair Summary
Failure easily repaired in all cases
Failure easily repaired in essentially all cases
Failure easily repaired in many cases
Failure usually repaired without problems in most
cases
Failure usually repaired but problems do occur in
some cases.
Failure often repaired but significant logistics
effort required in many cases

Parts seldom available and may require
long lead time

Failure is repairable but requires major logistics
effort in most cases

Parts require long lead time

Failure is usually repairable but with significant
logistics support problems.
Failure is not repairable without major logistic
effort in essentially all cases
Failure is not repairable without major logistic
effort in essentially all cases

Parts not available and long lead required
Parts not available and long lead required

Resolution: If actual numerical value falls between two values - always select the higher value. If the team has a disagreement in the ranking, use the
following approach: If adjacent categories, average the difference. For example, one member says 5 and one member says 6, the ranking would be 5.5. If
the disagreement is more than one category, consensus must be reached - even with one holdout. This indicates a serious difference in severity. Do not
use average or majority. Team may not agree 100% but able to “live with it.” Everyone must have ownership.
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Appendix B
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LP A IR SYSTEM EX PER T QUALIFYING Q UESTIONAIRE

Name:___________________________________________________________________

Date:_________________________

Education:
High School G raduate___
Undergraduate:___ D egree:_____________________________Date o f D egree:______
Graduate Degree(s):_______________________________________

Other Training:

Current Em ployer:_
Employer Address: _
Position:__________

Contact Information:
Work Phone:______
Em ail:____________
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General Information P acket

LP AIR SYSTEM

For general purposes, it will be assum ed that LP Air
system is comprised as indicated with a rotary helical
screw type compressor.
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^
Input To All Components

Operator

There are no
dehydrators in
Medium Pressure Air
plants

System
Integrity

Direct Flow

System
Boundary

ElectroMechanical
Signal
Alarms
Indications
& Pressure
Relief

System
Self
Protection

Trips

Control
Signals

Lubrication

Lube
Oil

440 VAC
- 60 Hz
3 Phase

Control
Power
Sensing
LP/MP Air
System
Line
Pressure

Auto
Start/Stop

Air
Compression
Water
Removal

Numerous
Inputs

Ambient
Air

>- Condensate
Drains
LP/MP
Air Out

Heat
T ransfer
Sea Water
Service In

**115 VAC,
—
60 Hz
or Chilled
Water

FW
Closed system
Cooling

Sea Water«
Service Out

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

1. Oil Pump
2. Oil Sump
3. Fresh water (FW)pump
(Reciprocating)
5. FW heat exchanger
FW surge tank (Recip.)
7. Intercoolers (Reciprocatimg)
8. Aftercoolers (Reciprocating)
11. Diaphragm control valve
12. FW thermostatic control
valve (Reciprocating)
Direct

Flow
1. Solenoid valves
2. Check valves
3. Diaphragm control valves
(Seawater)
4. Thermostatic control
valves (Fresh water)
5. Back pressure valves
6. Miscellaneous valves
System
Integrity

Air
Compression

Lubrication

Cooling

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Oil sump
Oil filter
Oil pump
Check valve
Oil strainer

System
Self
Protection

1. First stage discharge high air
temperature switch
2. Second stage discharge high
air temperature switch
3. First stage high condensate
level shutdown switch/probe
4. Second stage high condensate
level shutdown switch/probe
5. Low oil pressure shutdown
6. Condensate drain timer
relays
7. FW high temperature switch
8. Relief valves
9. Zinc anodes

1. Piping/hoses
2. Various component
casings and housings
3. Miscellaneous valves
4. Various gaskets & seals

Water
Removal
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

1.
2.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Compressor assembly
Belt Drive assembly
Drive motor
Motor controller
Unloading valve
Inlet filter /silencer

Sensing

1. Various sensors
- Air discharge pressure
- Heat exchanger pressure
differential
- Oil pressure
- Crankcase oil temp
- High FW cooling water
temp
- Sea water discharge temp
- High air temperature
- Cooling FW supply temp
- Sea water inlet temperature
- Moisture separator drain
level (Reciprocating)
- Dehydrator
CondensateWater Level

Water separators
Chiller/dehydrators
Drain monitors
Solenoid drain valves
Condensate sump
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Reciprocating (RCP) Compressor
Major Components

SneBort Systems/
Eafflpmsnt

Compressor

Dehydrator

Crankcase
Crankshaft
Flywheel
Bearings/Sleeves
Oil pump (attached)
Cylinder liner - Guide (MP only)
Piston - Guide (MP only)
Piston rings
Connecting rod
Cylinder Body
Cylinder Liner
Piston
Head
Inlet/discharge valves
Oil Sump
Strainer
Cylinder Unloaders (LP only)
Drain Trap

Moisture S eparator

M iscellaneous
(May be reported under
compressor or support

H eat Exchanger/coolers

systems)
Piping
Gages
Hoses
Gaskets
Filters
-Oil
- Air
- Coalescer Filter
Miscellaneous valves
Miscellaneous hardware

Drive Train
- Motor
- Motor sheave
- Bushing
- C ounterbalance assem bly
- Pulleys
- Belts
- Pulley Shafts
- S pacers
- Bearings
- Counterweights
- Bracket

Controller
- Switches
- S en so rs
- Relays
Solenoid valves
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NPar Tests Platform A

Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks

N
RPNHIST - RPNEXP

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

52a
35b
0C
87

Mean Rank
47.17
39.29

Sum of Ranks
2453.00
1375.00

a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP
c- RPNEXP = RPNHIST
Test Statistics?5

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNHIST RPNEXP
-2.282a
.023

a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNHIST - RPNEXP

Negative Differences?
Positive Differencesb
Ties0
Total

52
35
0
87

a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP
c. RPNEXP = RPNHIST
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNHIST RPNEXP
-1.715
.086

a. Sign Test

NPar Tests
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks

N
RPNADJ - RPNHIST

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

28a
57b
2C
87

Mean Rank
41.18
43.89

Sum of Ranks
1153.00
2502.00

a. RPNADJ < RPNHIST
b. RPNADJ > RPNHIST
c. RPNHIST = RPNADJ
Test Statistic#

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNHIST
-2.956a
.003

a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNADJ - RPNHIST

Negative Difference#
Positive Differences'3
Ties0
Total

28
57
2
87

a- RPNADJ < RPNHIST
b. RPNADJ > RPNHIST
C. RPNHIST = RPNADJ
Test Statistic#

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNHIST
-3.037
.002

a. Sign Test
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NPar Tests Platform B
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks

N
RPNHIST - RPNEXP Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

59®
25b
3C
87

Mean Rank
49.00
27.16

Sum of Ranks
2891.00
679.00

a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP
c- RPNEXP = RPNHIST
Test Statistics?5

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNHIST RPNEXP
-4.933a
.000

a. Based on positive ranks,
b- Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNHIST - RPNEXP

Negative Differences?
Positive Differences5
Ties'5
Total

59
25
3
87

a. RPNHIST < RPNEXP
b. RPNHIST > RPNEXP
c. RPNEXP = RPNHIST
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNHIST RPNEXP
-3.601
.000

a- Sign Test

NPar Tests
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks

N
RPNADJ - RPNH

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

13a
62b
2C
77

Mean Rank
32.58
39.14

Sum of Ranks
423.50
2426.50

a. RPNADJ < RPNH
b- RPNADJ > RPNH
C. RPNH = RPNADJ
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNH
-5.289a
.000

a. Based on negative ranks.

b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies
N
RPNADJ - RPNH

Negative Differences?
Positive Differences13
Ties0
Total

13
62
2
77

a- RPNADJ < RPNH
b. RPNADJ > RPNH
C. RPNH = RPNADJ
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNH
-5.543
.000

a. Sign Test
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NPar Tests Platform C
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks

N
RPNH - RPNE

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

55a
21b
6°
82

Mean Rank
41.92
29.55

Sum of Ranks
2305.50
620.50

a. RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE
c. RPNE = RPNH
Test Statistics?3

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNH RPNE
-4.362a
.000

a- Based on positive ranks,
b- Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNH - RPNE

Negative Differences3
Positive Differences13
Ties0
Total

55
21
6
82

a- RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE
c- RPNE = RPNH
Test Statistics*

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNH RPNE
-3.785
.000

a. Sign Test

NPar Tests
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks

N
RPNADJ-

Negative
Positive
Ties
Total

20 a
57 b
5c
82

Mean
41.18
43.89

Sum of
1153.0
2502.0

a. RPNADJ <
b. RPNADJ >
c. RPNHIST =
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNHIST
-2.956a
.003

a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNADJ - RPNHIST

Negative Differences3
Positive Differences13
Ties0
Total

28
57
2
87

a. RPNADJ < RPNHIST
b- RPNADJ > RPNHIST
c. RPNHIST = RPNADJ
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNHIST
-3.037
.002

a. Sign Test
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NPar Tests Platform D
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Ranks

N
RPNH - RPNE

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

58a
14b
5C
77

Mean Rank
39.41
24.43

Sum of Ranks
2286.00
342.00

a- RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE

c. RPNE = RPNH
Test Statistics^

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNH RPNE
-5.456a
.000

a. Based on positive ranks.
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNH - RPNE

Negative Differences?
Positive Differences15
Ties0
Total

58
14
5
77

a- RPNH < RPNE
b. RPNH > RPNE
c. RPNE = RPNH
Test Statistics?

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNH RPNE
-5.068
.000

a. Sign Test

NPar Tests
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
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Ranks

N
RPNADJ - RPNH

Negative Ranks
Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

13a
62b
2C
77

Mean Rank
32.58
39.14

Sum of Ranks
423.50
2426.50

a- RPNADJ < RPNH
b.

RPNADJ > RPNH

C. RPNH = RPNADJ

Test Statistics^

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNH
-5.289a
.000

a. Based on negative ranks,
b- Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

Sign Test
Frequencies

N
RPNADJ - RPNH

Negative Differences?
Positive Differences13
Ties0
Total

13
62
2
77

a. RPNADJ < RPNH
b- RPNADJ > RPNH
c. RPNH = RPNADJ
Test Statistic^

Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

RPNADJRPNH
-5.543
.000

a- Sign Test
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Platform A
Best Subsets Regression: RPN versus Severity, Occurrence, Repair

Vars

R-Sq

R-Sq(adj)

1
1
2
2
3

53 .4
28.1
86.4
58.4
91.1

52 .8
27.2
86.0
57 .4
90.8

n
i

Response is RPN

331.0
553 .2
43 .5
288 .9
4.0

S
25.049
31.119
13 .628
23.810
11.078

S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y

0
c
c
u
r
r
e
n

R
e
p
a
i
r

X
X
X X
X
X
X X X

Regression Analysis: RPN versus RXO-E
The regression equation is
RPN = - 4.31 + 5.67 RXO-E
Predictor
Constant
RXO-E

Coef
-4.305
5.6663

SE Coef
1.737
0.1398

S = 7.907

R-Sq = 95.4%

T
-2.48
40.54

R-Sq(adj)

P
0.015
0.000

= 95.3%

Analysis ofVariance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
1
80
81

SS
102730
5002
107732

MS
102730
63

F
1643.12

P
0.000

Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is
RPNadj = - 1.80 + 5.46 RXO-A
Predictor
Constant
RXO-A
S = 7.558

Coef
-1.797
5 .46349

SE Coef
1. 337
0.09716

R-Sq = 97.5%

T
-1. 34
56 .23
R-Sq(adj)

P
0.183

0.000

= 97.5%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
1
80
81

SS
180639
4570
185209

MS
180639
57

F
3162.00

P
0.000
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Platform B
Best Subsets Regression: RPNE versus SevE, OccrE, RepE
Response is RPNE

Vars
'S

R-Sq

1
1
2
2
3

54.5
34.3
80.7
63.8
89.7

R-Sq(

C-p

S

282 .7
444 .9
74 .0
209.9
4.0

16.349
19.641
10.707
14.667
7.8817

a d j )

53 .9
33.5
80.2
62.9
89.3

0
S c R
e c e
V
r P
E E E
X
X
X X
X
X
X X X

Regression Analysis: RPN E versus RxO E
The regression equation is
RPNE = - 4.30 + 3.68 RxO E
Predictor
Constant
RxO E

Coef
-4.295
3 .6773

S = 7.884
PRESS = 5596.52

SE Coef
1.673
0.1372

T
-2 .57
26 .79

R-Sq = 89.4%
R-Sq(pred) = 88.79%

P
0 .012
0.000
R-■Sq(adj)

= 89.

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Lack of Fit
Pure Error
Total

DF
1
85
14
71
86

SS
44620
5283
1352
3931
49902

F
717.91
1.74

0
0 .066

<B

0
1

Regression Analysis: R PN adj versus

MS
44620
62
97
55

The regression equation is
RPNadj = - 0.750 + 3. 36 RXO-A
Predictor
Constant
RXO-A

Coef
0.7505
3 .36161

S = 7.016
PRESS = 17676.9

SE Coef
0.6143
0.04775

T
-1.22
70.40

R-Sq = 93.4%
R-Sq(pred) = 93 .23%

P
0.223
0 .000
R-■Sq(adj) = 93 .

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Lack of Fit
Pure Error
Total

DF
1
352
13
339
353

SS
243947
17325
6063
11262
261272

MS
243947
49
466
33

F
4956 .33
14 .04

0
00 . 0 0 0
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Platform C
Best Subsets Regression: RPN versus Severity, Occurrence, Repair
Response is RPN

:s

R-Sq

R-Sq(adj)

C-p

S

1
1
2
2
3

55 .7
33.5
80 .7
64.0
89.5

55.2
32 .7
80.3
63.2
89.1

268.1
443 .8
71.6
204 .1
4.0

16 .021
19.625
10 .627
14 .523
7.8834

S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y

0
c
c
u
r
r
e
n

R
e
p
a
i
r
X

X
X X
X
X
X X X

Regression Analysis: RPN versus RXO-E
The regression equation is
RPN = - 4.29 + 3.66 RXO-E
Predictor
Constant
RXO-E

Coef
-4.294
3.6629

SE Coef
1.661
0.1367

S = 7.830

R-Sq = 89.4%

T
-2.59
26.80

R-Sq(adj)

P
0.011
0.000

= 89.3%

Analysis ofVariance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
1
85
86

SS
44031
5212
49242

MS
44031
61

F
718.14

P
0 . 000

Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is
RPNadj = - 1.89 + 3.48 RXO-A
Predictor
Constant
RXO-A
S = 7.469

Coef
-1.885
3 .48136

SE Coef
1.274
0.09477

R-Sq = 94.1%

T
-1.48
36.74
R-Sq(adj)

P
0 .143
0 . 000

= 94.

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
1
85
86

SS
75284
4742
80026

MS
75284
56

F
134.9.52

P
0 . 000
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Piatfotm D

Best Subsets Regression: RPN versus Severity, Occurrence, Repair
Response is RPN

rs

R-Sq

R-Sq(adj)

0
1
^0

S
e
v
e
r
i
t
S

1
1
2
2
3

54.4
27.3
86.3
59 .4
91.0

53 .8
26.4
85.9
58 .3
90 .6

296.6
516.6
40.5
258 .7
4 .0

25.345
32.011
14.015
24.100
11.417

0
c
c
u
r
r
e

yn

R
e
p
a
i
r

X
X
X X
X
X
X X X

Regression Analysis: RPN versus RXO-E
The regression equation is
RPN = - 4.26 + 5.67 RXO-E
Predictor
Constant
RXO-E

Coef
-4.261
5.6732

SE Coef
1.828
0.1453

S = 8.132

R-Sq = 95.3%

T
-2.33
39.04

R-Sq(adj)

P
0.022
0.000

= 95.2%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
1
75
76

SS
100807
4960
105767

MS
100807
66

F
1524.45

P

0.000

Regression Analysis: RPNadj versus RXO-A
The regression equation is
RPNadj = 6.03 + 2.41 RXO-A
Predictor
Constant
RXO-A

Coef
6.026
2.4135

SE Coef
2.425
0.1633

S = 14.92

R-Sq = 74.4%

T
2.48
14.78

R-Sq(adj)

P
0.015
0.000

= 74.1%

Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
Residual Error
Total

DF
1
75
76

SS
48642
16705
65347

MS
48642
223

F
218.39

p

0.000
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Compiling the H istorical Data for Comparison
Development of the Historical Data used to create a Historical RPN Comparative was
developed through the COMNAVSURJFLANT effort. The results o f the development o f the
Historical Data for the LP-MPAC are synopsized from internal COMNAVSURFLANT
documents (LP-MP Failure Mode Report, August 2002). Information from that report appears
here in abridged form for research consistency and military classification purposes.

Using the O pen Architecture Retrieval System (OARS), the D ata Analyst performed a search
query to extract maintenance actions (OPNAV 479Q/2Ks) for the past 5 years.

RADCOM

Configuration &
Maintenance

Maintenance
History Data

Ship Configuraiior
M anagement Date

LDS
MRP II
BAIM

Rrgiiij.ai

CL-umu

Mainland

Activities

Configuration
Job/Repair

D ata

Specifications

Legacy IMA
Others

OARS allows for the extraction and manipulation o f the
data in the Ships 3-M system.
F ig u re 11, M a in te n an ce D a ta F low
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The database selected was Ship’s 3-M and the standard reports used were ADO 15 (All
Maintenance Actions Plus Narrative) and AD08 (Maintenance Issues). D ue to the varied
nature o f reporting maintenance data on LP and MP compressed air plants, it was necessary
to cast a wide net to ensure all data was captured. Search queries were performed n o t only
on SWLINs 55152 and 55153 (Compressors, MP air and LP air respectively), but also on
SWLINs 55120 and 55121 (Air system, LP and MP). Table 7 displays the fields and entries
used to perform these search queries.

In the table, “H ” is the TYCOM code for

COMNAVSURFLANT. Both open and close ESWBS records were queried due to ESWBS
usually resident on at least one o f them.

Table 7, Search Query Fields (3-M OARS) Search Fields
Expression 1

Operator

Expression 2

L ogical Operand

(TYCOM_CODE

—

H)

AND

(DATE_OPENIN G

BETWEEN

01/01/1997 to
AND
03/01/2002)
(ESWBS_OPENING

—

55153

OR

ESWBS_CLOSING

~

55153

OR

ESWBS_OPENING

—

55121

OR

55121

OR

ESWBS_CLOSING
ESWBS_OPENING

—

55152

OR

ESWBS_CLOSING

—

55152

OR

ESWBS_OPENING

=

55120

OR

ESWBS_CLOSING

=

55120)
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The result was all 3-M maintenance data associated with COMNAVSURFLANT L P /M P air
compressors, which included some items n o t within the study boundaries. To refine the
data, a w ord search query was accomplished to isolate only those maintenance actions o f
interest within the original data download. The following 95 key words (associated with low
and medium air plants) were used in varied combinations to further electronically isolate the
data o f interest for the study:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Air Cylinder
Belt
Bearing
Compressor
Cooler
Cylinder (Head)
Cooler (Intercooler)
Cylinder (Liner)
Cooler (Lube)
Condenser
Coupling
Connecting Rod
Crankshaft
Controller
Cooling Water System
(Including Coolers)
Dehydrator
Dehydrator (Refrig. Type)
Drain Trap
Expansion Tank
Filter (Air) & Breather
Filter/Strainer (Injection
water)
Filter (Lube Oil)
Flow Switch
Float Switch
Float switch (Condensate)
Float Switch (Injection Sys)
Filter (Unloader)
Filters (Various)
Flywheel
Gasket
Gauge (Hour - Run Meter)
Gauge (Pressure)
Gauge (Temperature)
Gauge (Inj. Water Pressure)
Hose
Heat Exchanger (Fresh/SW)
Head Gasket
Head (High Pressure Assy)
Hold tank/separator
Indicators
Motor
Moisture Separator
Piston
Pulley
Pump (Oil)
Piping
Piston (ring)
Pressure Switch (Air)
Pressure Switch (Oil)
Pressure Switch (Injection
water)
Pump
Fresh Water Pump

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Pressure Transducer
Relay
Rod Packing
Rotor
Sump
Silencer/Muffler
Seal (Mechanical)

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Seal (O-ring)
Sump Strainer
Strainer (Seawater)
Sensor (temperature
Switches
Timing Gear
Timer
Timer Relays
Temperature Switch (Air)
Temperature Switch (Dew
Pt)
Temperature Switch (water)
Unloader Arm
Valve Backpressure
Valve (Check)
Salt Water System Cooling
Valves
Valve Assembly (LP
Discharge)
Valve (Receiver Drain)
FW Fill Valve
Valve (Injection System
Drain)
Priority Valve
Valve (Relief)
Valve (root)
Valve Assembly (LP
Suction)
Valve (Solenoid,
Condensate Dm)
Valve (Solenoid tank Drain)
Valve (Solenoid Injection)
Valve (Solenoid Valve
relay)
Unloader Valve Solenoid
Valve (SW Diaphragm
control)
Valve (Thermostat
Controlled)
Valve (Unloader)
Valve (Water Regulating)
Wiper Box
Water Lube Oil
Crosshead
Zinc Anodes

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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The 3-M OARS download and electronic sorting resulted in a total o f 12,185 maintenance
actions for low-pressure air plants [over five years] and a total o f 2,269 maintenance actions for
medium pressure air plants [also over five years]. The raw maintenance and cost data from
each OPNAV 4790/2K was reviewed for applicability to ensure the components were inside
the system study boundaries.

For purposes o f analysis, it became necessary to specify which components were part o f the
“compressor” and which were part o f supporting systems/components within the LP and MP
Air Plant System. Failures for several miscellaneous components or consumables are
applicable to both compressor and support equipment APLs. Therefore, for this situation, the
gauge, filter, valve, gasket, etc., reported under an equipm ent/com ponent APL was assumed to
be part o f the equipm ent/com ponent under which it was reported. However some o f these
components have their own APL and not attributed to a specific com ponent When this
occurs, the component is accounted for under it’s own APL.

The data was then modeled to yield probability o f failure over 12-month period in the
COMNAVSURFLANT effort. This data was provided for use in the historical RPN
comparative.

Additionally, the Navy has a Casualty Reporting (CASREP) system, where unit commanders
report mission degradation o f their ships to higher-level commanders.

This is a classified

report that is retained in a database. By removing the ship names and mission specifics,
CASREP data becomes unclassified and can be analyzed. LPAC/M PAC CASREP data was
gathered from the Navy consolidated CASREP reporting system for analysis in the
COMNAVSURFLANT effort.
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The vast majority o f CASREPs were C-2 level, indicating minor mission effects (mostly due to
redundancies in design) when one LPA C / MPAC was lost.

However, the much lower

population MPACs showed more C 3/C 4 CASREPs than LPACs, indicating loss o f a single
MPAC has significant mission effects in some cases. This is probably due to the lack o f an
H.P. Air system back up in MPAC ships.

The data was then modeled to yield effect o f failure on mission impact in the
COMNAVSURFLANT effort. This data was provided for use in the historical RPN
comparative.

The current maintenance strategies and tasks associated with low and medium pressure air
plants were found in the MAI, ICMP and PMS and are detailed as follows:

MAI (Master Assessment Index) - The COMNAVSURFLANT Master Assessment Index
(MAI) - accessible via the COMNAVSURFLANT web page - lists the maintenance objects
assessed during SEMAT. The MAI provides a list o f maintenance tasks and either the next
scheduled assessment date or the most recently completed assessment date.
database matures it is expected that both dates will be provided).

(As the MAI

The SEM AT tasks

incorporate thirteen tasks under the following ESWBSs: 55152 (Compressors, MP Air) and
55153 (Compressors, LP Air).

ICMP —The current ICMP maintenance strategy for low and medium pressure air plant
incorporates 13 tasks under the ESWBS 55121 (Air System, Low and Medium Pressure),
55152 (Compressors, MP Air) and 55153 (Compressors, LP Air).
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PMS -T h e PMS tasks for low and medium pressure air plants incorporates the 85 tasks under
the following Ship W ork Authorization Boundary (SWAB) number 5510 (Compressed air
systems) 5515 (Compressors, Air)

In addition to the ICMP, PMS and MAI, the following sources were reviewed for maintenance
requirements as they pertain to low and medium air pressure air plants: Naval Ships Technical
Manual (NSTM), Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM), Engineering for Reduced
Maintenance (ERM) and Cumbersome W ork Packages (CWP).

The COMNAVSURFLANT effort was able to derive a comparative nominal numeric score
for the level o f repair necessary to repair the system in the event o f failure. The data was
provided for use in the research.

The data yielding from this filtration, verification and validation o f the data resulted in
statistical data that, when applied to a FMEA model, produced a practical numeric comparison
that may be used to substantiate the expert solicitation FMEA model proposed in the research.
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